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[T]o say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives
direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What
obligations does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he
failed to discharge these obligations? And what are the
consequences of his deviation from duty?'
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INTRODUCTION
Chief executive officers wield enormous power in the modern
corporation. Such well-known names as Michael Eisner at the Walt
Disney Company, Martha Stewart, formerly at Martha Stewart
Living, Dick Grasso, formerly head of the New York Stock Ex-
change, and Dennis Kowzlowski, formerly at Tyco, embody the
influence of the modern CEO. When they and other senior officers
perform well, the enterprise and its stockholders are likely to
flourish; when they misbehave-as many have in recent years2-the
company, stockholders, creditors, employees, and others in society
suffer significant loss. Recent concern about officer wrongdoing has
resulted in numerous federal and state criminal charges,' the
initiation of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adminis-
trative proceedings,4 and imposition of new federal responsibilities
on officers through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.' At the same time,
Congress,' the SEC,7 the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),' and
2. See, e.g., Scandal Scorecard, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1 (detailing criminal
charges and investigations against various corporate officers). A timely analysis of conditions
contributing to corporate corruption in the 1990s is provided by Professor Lawrence Mitchell.
See LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY (2001); see also Lisa M. Fairfax,
Form over Substance?: Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced Personal
Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 4-15 (2002).
3. See Scandal Scorecard, supra note 2.
4. See id.
5. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). The provisions
bearing on corporate officers are codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7241, 7243, 7262, 7264 (Supp. 2003),
and at 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (Supp. 2003).
6. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 5, contains a number of provisions affecting
corporate directors. For example, section 301(m)(3) includes a requirement that audit
committee members be independent (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78f (Supp. 2003)); section 407
directs the SEC to issue rules requiring public companies to disclose whether the audit
committee is comprised of at least one member who is a financial expert (15 U.S.C. § 7265
(Supp. 2003)); section 202 requires that all audit and non-audit services provided by the
auditor be pre-approved by the audit committee (15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. 2003)); and section
402 forbids public companies from making loans to directors and executive officers (amending
15 U.S.C. § 78m (Supp. 2003)). These and other provisions affecting both directors and officers
are described in greater detail in Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Mark A. Sides, The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and Fiduciary Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149 (2004).
7. The SEC has promulgated many rules regulating corporate directors under Sarbanes-
Oxley. A complete description of these rules is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally
Johnson & Sides, supra note 6 (describing SEC rules under Sarbanes-Oxley).
8. The most important rules promulgated recently by the NYSE, and approved by the
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the Nasdaq9 all have prescribed new functions for boards of
directors and their committees. These initiatives, taken together,
aim to improve the overall functioning of corporate governance in
public corporations, at both the director level and the officer level.
This is not only a response to the widespread rash of recent
corporate scandals, but also the latest-and most dramatic--episode
in a larger effort to restore a healthy governance relationship
between corporate directors and corporate officers.
For all the renewed federal attention to regulating-and
differentiating-corporate officer and director functions, however,
a curious fact remains: state fiduciary duty law makes no distinction
between the fiduciary duties of these two groups. Instead, courts
and commentators routinely describe the duties of directors and
officers together, and in identical terms.' ° To lump officers and
SEC on November 4, 2003, Securities and Exchange Commission, Self-Regulatory
Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154, 64,157 (Nov. 12, 2003),
deal with requirements for director independence through amendments to Rule 303A of its
Listed Company Manual. See Johnson & Sides, supra note 6, at 1159-67 (describing NYSE
rules).
9. The most important new Nasdaq rules, approved by the SEC on November 4, 2003,
deal with the definitions and role of independent directors through amendments to Nasdaq
Rules 4200 and 4350. The aim of the amendments is "to provide greater transparency
regarding the definition of independence and to increase the roles and responsibilities of
independent directors and independent board committees." Letter from Mary M. Dunbar, Vice
President and Deputy General Counsel, Nasdaq, to Katherine A. England, Assistant Director,
Division of Market Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission, attach. at 2 (Oct. 9,
2003), available at http'J/www.Nasdaq.com/about/SR-NASD-2002-141_Amendment_3.pdf(last
visited Feb. 28, 2005); see also Johnson & Sides, supra note 6, at 1168-74 (describing Nasdaq
rules).
10. The foundational case on corporate fiduciary duties in Delaware states: "Corporate
officers and directors ... stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders."
Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). Later, the Delaware Supreme Court quoted the
following generalization approvingly: "Practically all jurisdictions recognize a fiduciary
relationship arising from the directors and officers to their corporation and to the
stockholders .... " Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 502-03 (Del. 1981) (quoting
Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748, 754 (5th Cir. 1959)). More
recently, Chancellor William Chandler, noting this current state of the law, stated: "[tlo date,
the fiduciary duties of officers have been assumed to be identical to those of directors." In re
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 15452,2004 WL 2050138, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10,
2004).
A leading corporate law treatise puts the matter as follows: "[C]orporate directors and
officers occupy a fiduciary capacity.... To a great extent, the rules governing liability are the
same whether the officer sued is a director or some other officer such as the president, vice
president, secretary ...." WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 3 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
1600
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directors together as generic "fiduciaries," with no distinction being
made between them, suggests-as patently is not the case-that
their institutional function and legal roles within the corporation
are the same. Such a view, consequently, undermines efforts to
distinguish more sharply, not blur, the governance responsibilities
of these two groups.
Failure to differentiate the duties of officers, who daily manage
corporate operations, from directors, who more remotely monitor
corporate affairs, stems from a puzzling failure to address an even
deeper issue in corporate law: What exactly is the theoretical and
conceptual basis for the widespread claim that corporate officers
owe fiduciary duties to a corporation and its stockholders? In other
words, to Justice Frankfurter's list of good questions to ask about
fiduciary status, we can add another: Why do corporate officers owe
fiduciary duties? Hardly a week goes by without yet another
Delaware decision addressing the subject of director duties. Yet,
surprisingly, no Delaware decision has ever clearly articulated the
subject of officer duties and judicial standards for reviewing their
discharge. For persons occupying such central places of power in
corporations, senior officers have largely succeeded in eluding the
distinctive attention of state corporation law. This is a puzzling
void.
The thesis of this Article is that corporate officers are fiduciaries
because they are agents. The rules and rationales of agency
principles-an entire body of law virtually ignored in corporate
governance-provide a coherent beginning point for systematically
developing both the reasons for, and the nature of, officer fiduciary
duties. Our argument is not that agency principles should be
introduced formalistically or uncritically into corporate govern-
ance." Rather, the claim, first, is that drawing on the fiduciary
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 837.50, 991 (rev. vol. 2002); see Hillary A. Sale, Delaware's Good
Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 462 n.28 (2004) ("[The fiduciary duties discussed in this
Article apply both to directors and officers."). The view in England also appears to be that
officers owe the same fiduciary duties as directors. PAUL L. DAVIES, COWER AND DAVIES'
PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 379 nn.43-44 (7th ed. 2003). No English case, however,
is cited. Instead, reference is made to a 1973 Canadian case, which in turn cited an earlier
version of the treatise as authority. Id. at 379 n.44.
11. Professor Donald Langevoort, focusing on the agent's duty of disclosure and the issue
of attributing an agent's knowledge to the firm, cautions against an undiscerning use of
agency rules in corporate governance. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside
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duties of agents for guidance in fashioning modern understandings
of corporate officer duties-and differentiating those duties from
those of directors-can provide much needed structure to what
otherwise threatens to be an ad hoc enterprise. Of course, an agent's
fiduciary duties being broadly sketched, they can be given shape
and content only in particular contexts. This case-by-case "fleshing
out" of officer duties must be done consistently with appropriate
expectations for senior officers in the early twenty-first century.
Second, providing a conceptual basis both to ground officer
fiduciary obligations and to distinguish director and officer functions
can substantially enhance the larger project of restoring to reality
the legal model of director-officer relations within the public
corporation.' 2 In this model, directors delegate to officers, acting as
agents, the role of managing the business and affairs of the
corporation. Although such delegation is entirely proper, both
functionally and as fiduciaries, directors must preserve for them-
selves a critical governance responsibility on behalf of the corporate
principal and its stockholders-monitoring the managerial perfor-
mance of officer-agents. This division of labor within corporate
governance is essential because organizational principals-be they
corporations, churches, universities, or other groups-differ from
individual principals. Having rightly delegated management of an
organization to agents, too often members of the governing body fail
to do what individual principals do for themselves, but what an
organization (lacking human capacity) cannot do: continue to
monitor and evaluate the persons to whom management has been
delegated. Agency law illuminates the nature of this director-officer
interaction and highlights how dysfunctional boards contributed to
recent governance scandals. Corporate interests were left unpro-
tected as officers operated free of any meaningful director supervi-
sion.
What are the benefits of our thesis? First, by understanding
officer duties and director-officer interaction in this way, it can be
seen that state law remains the primary source for establishing the
basic framework of corporate governance relations, both through
corporate statutes and through judge-made fiduciary duty law. With
the Corporation: Problems of Candor and Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 1187 (2003).
12. See infra Part II.C.
[Vol. 46:15971602
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a more highly differentiated state law model of director-officer
relations, recent efforts of Congress," the SEC,"' the NYSE, 5 and
Nasdaq 6 to impose new responsibilities on directors-designed to
improve their vital role in monitoring corporate officers-can be
understood as congruent with, rather than at odds with, the
underlying state law framework. The current emphasis on director
independence and the special focus on various board committees
-audit, nominating/governance, and compensation 7---can be seen
as an effort to develop mechanisms to aid the board both in
detaching itself from management and in divvying up the board's
key monitoring functions. Moreover, efforts by Congress and the
SEC to place additional and different functions on senior officers
can be seen as supplementing, rather than displacing, existing
state-law-based fiduciary duties of officers.
Recalling the agency law status of corporate officers, however,
does more than preserve state law as the cornerstone of governance
relationships in our federal system. At a practical level, and this is
the second benefit of our thesis, it clarifies immensely why courts
can and should scrutinize officer conduct more closely than they now
review director performance-i.e., the fiduciary duties of agents are
more demanding than those of directors, and officers rightly face a
greater risk of personal liability for misconduct. Heightened review
of officer performance is especially fitting given that many of the
recent corporate scandals involved wrongdoing at the officer level, 8
and given that state law has been eerily silent about why officers
owe duties at all, much less holding them to account. It is also
important in light of the fact that recent federal initiatives aimed at
improving officer performance eventually will be translated into,
and will heavily influence, state fiduciary duty analysis. 9
The third payoff of our thesis is several theoretical implications.
These include our belief that we are entering an era when, due both
to heavier corporate regulation and re-thinking of a shareholder-
13. See supra note 6.
14. See supra note 7.
15. See supra note 8.
16. See supra note 9.
17. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
18. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
19. For a full exposition of how federal initiatives will influence fiduciary duty analysis,
see Johnson & Sides, supra note 6.
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centered conception of corporate relationships, ° the entity concep-
tion of the firm will be strengthened. Positive law-including agency
law-builds on, and so reinforces, that understanding of corporate
relations. This current re-thinking follows a span of perhaps twenty
years when a highly "disaggregated" conception of corporate
relations-the nexus of contracts theory-has predominated. We
also believe that in the policy arguments for and against strong
fiduciary duties over the years, virtually no attention has been given
to distinguishing whether what is fitting for outside directors in the
fiduciary duty area-relatively slack duties-is also fitting for
corporate officers. Moreover, although agency law suggests greater
liability for officers than directors, widespread and longstanding
failure to understand officers in those terms means corporate law
cannot as confidently assume that existing liability outcomes for
officers are optimal, as might be the case with rules governing
directors.2 We believe that, from a policy perspective, the fiduciary
duties and liability rules for officers should be analyzed separately
from those for outside directors. Contemporary corporate law and
fiduciary discourse, however, do not do so, thereby hindering
attention to this subject. In the terms recently used by Professors
Black, Cheffins, and Klausner to describe the state of the law
governing "outside" directors, we believe the "window" of liability
risk for "inside" directors-i.e., officers-is in fact wide open, even
though it is thought, wrongly, to be virtually shut.22
After Part I describes and attempts to explain the odd void in
both positive law and corporate theory on the distinctive fiduciary
status of corporate officers, Part II briefly describes those duties and
then addresses at greater length why that status matters to
corporate law and theory. We also draw various policy conclusions
in that final section and suggest avenues for further inquiry.
20. See infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
21. See BERNARD BLACK, BRIAN CHEFFINs, & MICHAEL KLAUSNER, OUTSIDE DIRECTOR
LIABILITY (Stanford Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No.
250, 2003), available at httpJ/papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=382422 (last
visited Jan. 27, 2005). Our article specifically treats "inside" directors as well as officers who
are not directors.
22. See id.
[Vol. 46:15971604
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I. CORPORATE OFFICERS AS AGENTS: THE ROLES OF LAW,
INSTITUTIONAL REALITY, AND THEORY IN SHAPING DISCOURSE
A. Officers in Corporate Governance
Contemporary debates over corporate governance ills and reforms
have, in a rather puzzling way, forgotten some basic distinctions
between two critical participants in corporate governance: directors
and officers. First, directors, unlike officers, are elected and can be
removed by stockholders;23 officers are appointed and can be
removed only by, or under a grant of authority from, directors.24
Second, neither the board of directors as a body, nor individual
directors, are agents of either the stockholders or of the
corporation;25 officers, such as the chief executive officer, the chief
23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2001); 2 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.28 (3d ed.
Supp. 1998-1999).
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142 (2001); 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACTANN. § 8.40 (3d ed. Supp.
2000-2002). Technically, under Delaware's corporate statute, officers are to be chosen in the
manner "prescribed by the by-laws or determined by the board of directors or other governing
body." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(b). It is possible, though extremely unlikely, that the
bylaws of a public corporation could provide for selection of officers by persons other than
corporate directors, such as stockholders.
25. This assertion is universally accepted today. See, e.g., Burcham v. Unison Bancorp,
Inc., 77 P.3d 130, 147 (Kan. 2003) ("It would be an analytical anomaly ... to treat corporate
directors as agents of the corporation when they are acting as fiduciaries of the stockholders
.... ") (quoting Arnold v. Soc'y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 678 A.2d 533, 540 (Del. 1996));
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14C (1958) ("Neither the board of directors nor an
individual director of a business is, as such, an agent of the corporation or of its members.");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001) (noting
assertion that directors are not agents); Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary
Duties 55, 56, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (John W. Pratt &
Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) ("[Dlirectors are not agents of the corporation ... [or] of the
stockholders."). Many courts and commentators, however, were describing directors as agents
as recently as several decades into the twentieth century. See, e.g., Rudolph E. Uhlman, The
Legal Status of Corporate Directors, 19 B.U. L. REV. 12, 12-13 (1939). An excellent early, but
initially ignored, decision rejecting characterization of directors as agents is Hoyt v.
Thompson's Executor, 19 N.Y. 207 (1859). The court stated:
The board of directors of a corporation do [sic] not stand in the same relation to
the corporate body which a private agent holds toward his principal.... [I~n
corporate bodies, the powers of the board of directors are, in a very important
sense, original and undelegated. The stockholders do not confer, nor can they
revoke those powers.
Id. at 216. Much theoretical work in corporate scholarship, however, continues to conceive of
directors as "agents" of shareholders, especially in advocating a "monitoring" model of the
board of directors. See Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1597
financial officer, general counsel, executive vice presidents, and
many others,26 all are agents of the corporation,27 the principal.
Third, directors are fiduciaries for the corporation and its stockhold-
ers notwithstanding the fact that they are not agents;28 corporate
on Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667,
673-77 (2003) (citing scholarship). Professor Stout's insightful article fleshes out alternative
conceptions of the board of directors' role in corporate governance. We elaborate in this Article
a conception of the officers' role and the nature of officer fiduciary duties.
26. For example, the bylaws of Enron Corporation provide very broadly that its officers
shall be
a Chairman of the Board, a President, one or more Vice Presidents (any one or
more of whom may be designated Executive Vice President or Senior Vice
President), a Treasurer, a Secretary, a General Counsel, and such other officers
as the Board of Directors may from time to time elect or appoint (including, but
not limited to, a Vice Chairman of the Board, a Deputy Corporate Secretary, one
or more Assistant Secretaries and one or more Assistant Treasurers).
Bylaws of Enron Corp., art. v, § 1, available at http-//contracts.corporate.findlaw.com/
agreements/enron/bylaws.1996.02.13.html (last visited Oct. 6,2004). Such language is typical
for public corporations, with the result that there are many officers in most companies. In
addition to de jure officers, de facto officers are those persons who actually exercise the duties
of an officer without holding formal office, and they too owe fiduciary duties. See, e.g., In re
Holiday Isles, Ltd., 29 B.R. 827, 830 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983).
27. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.42 official cmt. (3d ed. Supp. 1998-1999)
("Consistent with the principles of agency, which generally govern the conduct of corporate
employees, an officer is expected .... "); HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON
CORPORATIONS § 103 (1927) ("The president, treasurer, secretary, manager, cashier, and other
officers of a corporation are memerly [sic] its agents ...."); Langevoort, supra note 11, at 1191
("Almost every corporate employee with discretionary responsibilities is an agent .... "); see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.03 cmt. e(1) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2001) ("Corporate
legislation contemplates that the corporation's directors and in some instances its
shareholders have power to and will appoint officers as agents of the corporation."). Unlike
the Restatement (Second) of Agency, the Restatement (Third) of Agency-now in draft-will
deal with organizational principals as well as individual principals. Despite these many
proper descriptions, there are remarkably few cases that acknowledge the agency status of
officers in actions brought by the corporation, or a stockholder, against an officer. See, e.g.,
Shields v. Cape Fox Corp., 42 P.3d 1083, 1091 (Alaska 2002); Potter v. Pohlad, 560 N.W.2d
389, 394 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) ("We agree that officers, as agents of the corporation, have an
obligation to disclose information material to the board's ability to make an informed decision
...."). There are, however, countless cases involving disputes between corporations and third
parties where the agency status of corporate officers is undisputed, although the scope of their
authority is hotly contested. See generally Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., The Corporate Officer
and the Law of Agency, 44 VA. L. REV. 1273 (1958) (discussing the authority of executive
officers).
28. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) ("The directors of Delaware corporations
stand in a fiduciary relationship not only to the stockholders but also to the corporation upon
whose boards they serve."); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,955 (Del. 1985)
("[C] orporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the corporation's
stockholders.").
1606
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officers are fiduciaries because they are agents. The very definition
of "agency" expresses its fiduciary nature,29 while also capturing the
essential idea that the agent must act on behalf of the principal and
subject to the principal's control.30
That officers are agents, and therefore fiduciaries subject to the
control of directors acting on behalf of the corporate principal, can
be seen in the basic architecture of governance established by
corporate statutes. Simply put, stockholders elect directors31 who,
by statute,32 exercise, or authorize others to exercise, all corporate
powers and manage, or direct others in the management of, the
business and affairs of the corporation. The board of directors, in
other words, is endowed with plenary governance authority and is
the body most centrally responsible for the well-being of the
corporate enterprise. Yet, in a public corporation, directors do
not-because realistically, they cannot-exercise their statutory
prerogative to manage. Instead, the management function is vested
by the board in others they appoint-officers-who act under the
board's "direction."33 Acting on behalf of the corporation, the board
of directors appoints and sets the compensation of senior officers,
delegates managerial responsibilities to those officers, and monitors
and evaluates the managerial performance of officers. Officers,
though wielding vast delegated power and authority, are agents of
the corporation itself, whose interests the board of directors must
ultimately protect. As agents, corporate officers owe an array of
fiduciary duties.' Breach of any of these duties affords the principal
29. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OFAGENCY § 1 ("Agency is the fiduciary relation which results
from the manifestation of consent by one person [the principal] to another [the agent] that the
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.");
see Fasciana v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 829 A.2d 160, 169 & n.30 (Del. Ch. 2003).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1.
31. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
32. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) ("The business and affairs of every corporation
organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of
directors .....); see also 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.01(b) (3d ed. Supp. 2000-2002) ("All
corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs
of the corporation managed by or under the direction of, its board of directors .... ").
33. See infra Part II.C. For commentary on the importance of the word "direction" in the
corporate statute, see Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 787,808 (1999). Of course, a person may serve both as a director and as an officer
of a particular corporation.
34. See infra Part II.A.
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a host of remedies," including a tort action for losses caused by the
breach. This, in theory, is how officers, in their capacity as agents,
fit into the standard model of corporate governance.
Critically, however, although officers, like all agents, are to act on
behalf of their principal,36 it is not their function, nor is it within
their fiduciary duty, to monitor their own performance on behalf of
the principal.37 According to basic agency law norms, that function
remains the responsibility of the principal itself, whether it is an
individual or a complex organization.3" In the case of an organiza-
tional principal, that responsibility necessarily must be discharged
by a governing body, such as the business corporation's board of
directors or a university's board of trustees. There appears to be a
widespread tendency, however, for such governing bodies, after
delegating responsibilities to management, to avoid developing
structures, systems, and mechanisms to monitor, supervise, and, if
need be, control management on an ongoing basis.39 Too often,
delegation of management-necessary and proper-foreshadows the
unnecessary and improper relinquishment of the principal's power
and duty to control. In a corporation, the responsibility for repre-
senting corporate interests in relation to senior officers belongs to
the board of directors.4 Failure to discharge that function is an
abdication of the board of directors' statutory responsibility for
providing "direction" over the corporation's business and affairs,
and it is a breach of the fiduciary duties it owes to the corporation
and its stockholders.4'
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 399.
36. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
37. An officer's governance function and fiduciary duty may, however, require the officer
to monitor the performance of a more junior officer. The authors thank Professor Deborah
DeMott for emphasizing this point. For example, a CEO should be regarded as having both
the governance responsibility to monitor the performance of the chief operating officer (COO)
and the fiduciary duty to disclose to the board of directors pertinent information about the
COO's faulty conduct. The Enron Bankruptcy Examiner criticized two senior officers of Enron
for their failure in this regard. See infra notes 171-72.
38. The nature of an agency relationship is such that the agent consents to be subject to
the principal's control, throughout the relationship. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1,
14.
39. See infra notes 78-95 and accompanying text.
40. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 156-70 (1976);
Jill Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265 (1997) (contrasting monitoring
and managerial conceptions of the board of directors).
41. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-70 (Del. Ch. 1996).
[Vol. 46:15971608
20051 RECALLING WHY CORPORATE OFFICERS ARE FIDUCIARIES 1609
Within the field of corporate governance, the undoubted legal
status of corporate officers as agents is rarely noted." The agency
status of officers seems to be far more significant to the issue of
whether, in a particular case, officers have power to affect the
corporation's relationship with third parties than to the issue of the
fiduciary duties owed by officers, as agents, to their corporate
principal. Although the fiduciary status of corporate officers is
widely noted,43 two points about the recognition of that status are
conspicuous. First, it is only rarely grounded on agency principles."
Second, it is not differentiated from the fiduciary status of
directors.45 Moreover, in contrast to the countless cases brought
against directors, relatively little litigation asserting breach of
fiduciary duty claims against officers seems to have been brought
either by boards of directors or, derivatively, by shareholders.46 This
latter phenomenon may be changing, however, as the governance
scandals of the late 1990s are leading to the initiation of civil
litigation against corporate officers in their specific capacity as
officers. Two high-profile examples include the Enron Bankruptcy
Examiner's recent conclusion that Enron's senior officers breached
fiduciary duties,47 and the Kmart Creditor Trust's litigation against
former officers for breach of fiduciary duty."
Historically, however, for the most part, officers appear not to be
sued for fiduciary wrongdoing as officers. Addressing Delaware
law, a leading corporate law treatise summarily states: "[flew
authorities deal with the nature of the obligation owed by officers
42. See infra notes 56, 189 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 56, 189 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
46. A leading treatise on corporate directors and officers summed up the state of the law
as follows: "[Tihere is little law on the subject of the liability of corporate officers who are not
directors." WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, 1 LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND
DIRECTORS § 1.15, at 1-53 (7th ed. 2003).
47. Third Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, In re Enron Corp.,
No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2003), httpJ/news.corporate.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docx/enron/enronbk72803xr3.pdf. As noted below, the Examiner conflates officer and
director duties, as is the unfortunate norm in fiduciary discourse. See infra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text.
48. See Complaint and Jury Demand, Kmart Creditor Trust v. Charles Chetwynn
Conaway (Mich. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 18, 2003) (No. 03-054233-CZ).
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to the corporation and its stockholders." 49 The foundational duty of
loyalty case in Delaware, moreover, groups officers and directors
together when discussing fiduciary obligations, 0 neither distin-
guishing the differing roles of directors and officers in corporate
governance nor articulating any theoretical bases for imposing a
single conception of fiduciary duties on officers as well as directors.5'
This approach appears predominant in commentary and case law.52
Other case law, however, ignores the issue altogether, offering no
explicit basis for imposing officer fiduciary duties.53 In the most high
profile corporate case today-Enron-the Bankruptcy Examiner
concluded: "As a general matter, corporate officers owe the same
fiduciary duties to the corporation as do corporate directors."54
49. R. FRANKLIN BAIOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, 1 THE DELAWARE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.17, at 4-36 (3d ed. Supp. 2003); see A.
Gilchrist Sparks III & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director
Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215, 215 (1992) ("The precise nature of the duties and
liabilities of corporate officers who are not directors is a topic that has received little attention
from courts and commentators.").
50. See Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
51. The Delaware Supreme Court, however, has properly applied agency principles as the
legal basis for imposing duties on non-officer employees. See Science Accessories Corp. v.
Summagraphics Corp., 425 A.2d 957 (Del. 1980). In doing so, the court stated: "TheD
principles and limitations of agency law carry over into the field of corporate employment so
as to apply not only to officers and directors but also to key managerial personnel." Id. at 962.
The statement about directors being agents is wrong. See supra note 25 and accompanying
text. The court's correct statement about officers being agents has never been cited by a
Delaware court for that proposition. It was, however, cited by the Minnesota Court of Appeals
in a decision applying Delaware law. See Potter v. Pohlad, 560 N.W.2d 389, 394 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997); see also Lazard Debt Recovery GP, LLC v. Weinstock, C.A. No. 19503, 2004 WL
1813286, at *8 (Del. Ch. Aug. 6, 2004) (citing agency principles in litigation involving
partnerhsip); In re eBay Inc. S'holders Litig., No. CA. 19988-NC, 2004 WL 253521, at *5 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 11, 2004) (noting common law duty of agent).
52. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
53. An example is Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146 (Me. 1995),
now a leading case on the subject of corporate opportunity. The case involved a claim that a
corporation's president had usurped corporate opportunities. Id. at 1148. The Supreme Court
of Maine began its legal analysis by asserting that "[c]orporate officers and directors bear a
duty of loyalty to the corporations they serve." Id. Thereafter, the court referred to "corporate
fiduciaries" and described the president as a "fiduciary" without stating why a corporate
president occupies that status. See id. at 1148-49.
It is not that the fiduciary status of officers is in doubt. It is, rather, as Justice Frankfurter
noted long ago, that simply to state that someone is a fiduciary is to state relatively little. See
supra text accompanying note 1.
54. Third Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, app. B at 6, In re
Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2003), httpJ/news.corporate.
findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/enronbk72803xr3.pdf.
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Commenting on the corporate law applicable to Enron-the law of
Oregon-the Examiner noted that "Oregon courts have referred to
the fiduciary duties of officers and directors interchangeably."5 In
short, although officers and directors occupy distinctive roles in
corporate governance, most corporate law authority uncritically
obliterates that distinction when it comes to fiduciary duties.
B. Forgetting Why Officers Are Fiduciaries
There may be several reasons for the striking dearth of attention
to the distinctive status of corporate officers as fiduciaries.5 6 First,
boards of directors may deal with officer misconduct by contractual
means. That is, boards may negotiate settlements with officers
as part of an intracorporate sanction, whether that sanction be
discharge, reprimand, compensation adjustment, demotion, or
delayed promotion. Given that the majority of officers leaving office
due to violations of corporate ethics and compliance codes receive
severance packages," it is likely as well that this resolution entails
the release of all claims, whatever the underlying legal theory of
55. Id.
56. This is not to say that there are no decisions holding officers liable for breach of
fiduciary duty. There are several, though far fewer than one might expect. See Sparks &
Hamermesh, supra note 49 (collecting cases); see also KNEPPER & BAILEY, supra note 46, §
1.15. What is puzzling is the dearth of decisional law squarely grounding liability on agency
law or acknowledging that it is the officer's status as an agent that carries with it-for sound
economic and policy reasons-strong fiduciary duties. See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R.
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BuSINESS ENTERPRISES § 219, at 586 (3d ed.
1983) (stating that "officers ... are agents of the corporation, and, as such, subject to the usual
principles of agency law, including the fiduciary duties of agents," but citing no decisions). The
lack of conceptual clarity as to the rationale for officer liability was true in Justice Holmes's
famous 1920 opinion holding a bank president liable for mismanagement, Bates v. Dresser,
251 U.S. 524 (1919), and remains true in 2005, as seen by a recent federal court decision
holding a chief executive officer personally liable for losses associated with putting his
daughter on the corporate payroll and allowing her to use corporate property. See Pereira v.
Cogan, 294 B.R. 449,539 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). These cases are rightly decided, and the Bates case
is rich in facts supporting liability, the Court noting the president's "responsibility, as
executive officer ... and knowledge, from long daily presence in the bank," 251 U.S. at 530, but
both lack a clearly articulated theoretical and doctrinal underpinning.
57. The Conference Board, a New York business research group, conducted a poll of fifty
employers and found that 62% of respondents gave a financial package to executives who left
because of major violations of ethics and compliance codes. Joann S. Lublin, Windfalls Are
Common in Ousters over Alleged Ethics Violations, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2003, at B8.
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liability. Consequently, reported decisions involving officers would
be infrequent.
Second, lawyers for shareholders, and perhaps also for boards of
directors, and even judges, simply may not appreciate the distinc-
tive fiduciary obligations owed by officers to the corporation as
agents,5" obligations existing in addition to those created expressly
by contract. Although it is standard practice for corporate counsel
to advise directors of their fiduciary duties, it seems doubtful that
officers (or directors) are routinely advised by legal counsel that
officers owe duties in their capacity as officers.
Third, lawyers may not fully appreciate the fiduciary duties of
agents in the corporate context because law schools today appear to
devote significantly less time and attention to agency law principles
than they did, say, thirty or forty years ago. Fourth, until the 1980s,
most boards had a majority of "inside" directors-i.e., directors who
were also employed by the company.59 These senior officers,
accordingly, already had fiduciary duties in their capacity as
directors. Understandably, this may have led lawyers, courts, and
commentators to overlook the distinctive duties owed as officers,
and to group officers and directors together as "corporate fiducia-
ries."60
Fifth, until January 1, 2004, the Delaware Chancery Court did
not have personal jurisdiction over officers as such.6' Accordingly,
legal action against officers who were not also directors could
not-absent other jurisdictional means-be brought in the Chancery
Court. In recent law review articles, Chancellor Chandler and Vice
Chancellor Strine, and, separately, Professor Hillary Sale, argue
that Delaware's lack of personal jurisdiction might be the reason no
claims have been made against officers. 62 Before a claim can be
58. See infra Part II.A (specifying fiduciary duties of officers).
59. Until the 1970s, the boards of most public corporations consisted primarily of inside
directors. ROBERT W. HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATIONS 688-89 (8th ed. 2003).
By the late 1980s, however, most public corporations had a clear majority of non-management
directors. See Paul H. Zalecki, The Corporate Governance Roles of the Inside and the Outside
Directors, 24 U. TOL. L. REv. 831,838-39 (1993).
60. See, e.g., supra notes 50, 54-55 and accompanying text.
61. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (2003).
62. See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State,
152 U. PA. L. REv. 953, 1003 (2003); Sale, supra note 10, at 462 n.28.
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brought, however, a theoretical and doctrinal rationale for it must
exist. The causal direction, therefore, possibly runs the other way,
and the reason Delaware did not assert jurisdiction over officers
may be that no one considered officers to occupy a fiduciary status
distinct from that of directors.6 3 Now that jurisdiction does exist in
Delaware, agency law provides the legal rationale for imposing
fiduciary duties on corporate officers and can provide the theory
supporting monetary claims by the corporation based on officer
misconduct.6"
Finally, the overly "cozy" relationship between boards of directors
and senior officers that has been the subject of much recent
criticism may result in a corporate culture in which directors do not
regard officers as persons owing high fiduciary duties to the
corporation.65 Instead, they may feel indebted to the officer or
believe it is their responsibility to support senior officers. Indeed,
they may still regard those officers, especially a chief executive
officer, as "the boss"6 and therefore akin to the principal, rather
63. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L- REV. 859,905 (2003) (describing the "hole in
Delaware law brought about by the lack of liability for, and concomitant inability to sustain,
suits for breaches of the [officer] fiduciary duty of care").
64. Former Chief Justice Veasey of the Delaware Supreme Court recently described as a
"likely development" a "new focus on litigation going after officers," but he specified "fraud"
rather than violation of fiduciary duties as the expected theory in such cases. E. Norman
Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics in the Post-Enron WorldCom Environment, 38
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 839,851 (2003).
65. SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman, speaking to the National Association of
Corporate Directors on October 20, 2003, addressed what she called the "closed nomination
process dominated by powerful CEOs, and the entrenchment of directors, [which] led to an
unhealthy coziness in some instances between ostensibly independent directors and the
executives whose performance they were supposed to oversee." Proposed Proxy Access for
Shareholders May Go Too Far, SEC's Glassman Tells NACD, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA),
No. 43, at 1814 (Nov. 3, 2003); see also Chandler & Strine, supra note 62, at 967 (describing
recent reforms as seeking to "cleanse the independent director ranks of corporate America of
persons whose familial, personal, professional, or financial affiliations with management cast
doubt on their ability to pursue only the interests of the company's stockholders").
66. SEC Chairman William Donaldson described the problem as follows:
Over the past decade or more, at too many companies, the chief executive
position has steadily increased in power and influence. In some cases, the CEO
had become more of a monarch than a manager. Many boards have become
gradually more deferential to the opinions, judgments and decisions of the CEO
and senior management team. This deference has been an obstacle to directors'
ability to satisfy the responsibility that the owners-the shareholders-have
delegated and entrusted to them.
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than, as is the case legally, an agent owing fiduciary responsibility
to the corporation, whose institutional interests the directors are
under their own distinct fiduciary duty to protect.
6 7
The last point warrants elaboration because it reflects a perva-
sive and longstanding problem in corporate governance. Corporate
statutes clearly ordain a governance arrangement contemplating
that directors, not officers, will play the central role in corporate
governance." There long has been a widespread belief, nonethe-
less, that, in fact, officers wield greater influence in corporate
affairs than do directors.69 This stunning, de facto "reversal of
SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson, Remarks at the 2003 Washington Economic Policy
Conference, National Association for Business Economics (Mar. 24, 2003), at httpJ/www.
sec.gov/news/speech/spch032403whd.htm. As Professor Daniel Kleinberger puts it, "the agent
may be the 'star' and the principal merely the supporting context. Consider, for example,
Itzhak Perlman serving for a season as first violinist of a metropolitan orchestra or Barry
Bonds playing baseball for the San Francisco Giants." DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, AGENCY,
PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCs: EXAMPLEs AND ExPLANATIONS 117 n.2 (2d ed. 2002). As SEC
Chairman Donaldson noted, to those names could be added the names of many high-profile,
forceful corporate CEOs.
67. Vice Chancellor Strine, addressing a related legal issue, recently described more
generally how the social dynamic for corporate directors may inhibit them from fully
discharging their responsibilities:
Nor should our law ignore the social nature of humans. To be direct, corporate
directors are generally the sort of people deeply enmeshed in social institutions.
Such institutions have norms, expectations that, explicitly and implicitly,
influence and channel the behavior of those who participate in their operation.
Some things are "just not done," or only at a cost, which might not be so severe
as a loss of position, but may involve a loss of standing in the institution. In
being appropriately sensitive to this factor, our law also cannot assume-absent
some proof of the point-that corporate directors are, as a general matter,
persons of unusual social bravery, who operate heedless to the inhibitions that
social norms generate for ordinary folk.
In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003).
68. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
69. Perhaps the most famous study in support of this position is that published in 1971
by Professor Myles Mace. MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 72-85, 190-94
(1971); see also Myles L. Mace, The President and the Board of Directors, 50 HARV. Bus. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1972, at 37 (describing how directors actually interact with corporate presidents).
This remains a widely shared view. See supra notes 65-67; infra text accompanying notes 93-
95. Although a later study by Professors Jay Lorsch and Elizabeth Maclver found that boards
of directors played a more central governance role in the late 1980s than Professor Mace had
found, see JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF
AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 75-96 (1989), that finding does not necessarily mean that
senior officers do not still hold substantial influence over corporate management. See Robert
W. Hamilton, Corporate Governance in America 1950-2000: Major Changes but Uncertain
Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349, 363-64 (2000).
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control,""0 to use sociologist Harrison White's phrase, is the key
animating force in recent congressional,' SEC, 2 NYSE, 3 and
Nasdaq74 governance reforms. In various ways, the regulatory
initiatives of these bodies seek to rectify this deep-rooted problem
of "role reversal" in the state law-created system of corporate
governance. Congress and the SEC, through the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act, sought to meliorate the perceived imbalance of power by
directly imposing new federal responsibilities on corporate officers.75
Those bodies, joined by the NYSE and Nasdaq,7 ' also substantially
bolstered the obligations of directors. 7
Current federal reforms aim directly to fix a longstanding
reversal of control problem made possible not because of defects
unique to the basic architecture of corporate governance, but rather
due to problems inherent in the dynamics of principal-agent
relationships in all complex organizations, including, as Professor
White notes, corporations and churches.7 ' Reversal of control in
principal-agent relationships was observed by Karl Llewellyn as
long ago as 1930. 71 In words worth remembering by those who work
in corporate governance, Llewellyn first noted the central impor-
tance of agency principles in business enterprises by pointing out
that agency "remains the major building material, even in the
corporate structure.""0 He then identified how "with growing
specialization, agency takes on another aspect ... [as] the specialized
purveyor ... moves largely out of the control of his principal, [and]
becomes an independent unit ... [who] may gather sufficient
financial power to finance and even control his scattered 'princi-
70. Harrison C. White, Agency as Control, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF
BusINEss 187, 205 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
71. See supra note 6.
72. See supra note 7.
73. See supra note 8.
74. See supra note 9.
75. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of these
responsibilities, see Johnson & Sides, supra note 6.
76. See supra notes 8-9.
77. See supra notes 6-7.
78. See White, supra note 70, at 205-08.
79. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Agency, in 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 483,484
(Edwin R.A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1930).
80. Id.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
pals."'' In other words, the agent, not the principal, wields control.
Professor White considers this insidious tendency to be the key
"conundrum" of agency relationship.82 The reversal of control can be
so deep-seated in an organization that it ironically threatens to
undermine the "root" purpose of agency, that is, to deploy the agent
to enlarge the realm of the principal's control.8 3
Llewellyn's and White's generic description of control reversal in
principal-agent relationships nicely captures the dynamic between
corporate directors and officers, a dynamic first criticized promi-
nently in the early 1970s. The gist of the governance critique was
that the director-centered statutory model of corporate relationships
was more myth than reality.' This analysis of the director-officer
interface was greatly substantiated by Professor Myles Mace's
devastating empirical findings on director activities.8 It comple-
mented the critique-leveled forty years earlier by Berle and
Means-that, in shareholder-director interaction, directors, rather
than shareholders, exercised control.8 6
The reversal of control in corporate governance from the
principal-the corporation, as represented by the board of directors
-to the agent-the chief executive officer and other senior officers
-was manifested in several ways by the early 1970s. First, rather
than directors selecting the chief executive officer (CEO), the CEO
often handpicked candidates for the board, many of whom, in those
days, also worked for the company and, as such, were beholden to
the CEO." Second, the CEO, rather than the board, usually selected
a successor CEO.88 Third, the board generally "[did] not establish
[corporate] objectives, strategies, and policies"; rather, this was done
by the CEO.8 9 Fourth, the board rarely asked discerning questions
81. Id.
82. See White, supra note 70, at 208.
83. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 30.
84. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
85. See MACE, supra note 69, at 72-85, 190-94 (describing the reality of corporate directors
failing to hold the president to account).
86. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (Harcourt, Brace, & World, Inc. 1968) (1932).
87. See Barry Baysinger & Robert E. Hoskisson, The Composition of Boards of Directors
and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy, ACAD. MGMT. REV. 72, 72-73 (1990);
Mace, supra note 69, at 40, 43.
88. Mace, supra note 69, at 43.
89. Id. at 41.
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of officers at meetings.9 0 Finally, the board's key roles shrank to
offering advice and counsel to the CEO, serving as discipline for
the CEO through the ritual of the CEO making regular reports to
the board and acting as a decision-making body only in crisis.9'
Moreover, when that crisis involved declining enterprise profitabil-
ity, directors tended to procrastinate and avoid taking corrective
action, preferring instead simply to hope the situation would
somehow improve. 2
C. Officer Control Subdues the Legal Model
This officer-centered pattern of corporate power is a long way
from the legal model, according to which the board exercises control
over corporate affairs. As expressed by former Supreme Court
Justice Arthur Goldberg, writing in 1972, a modern board of
directors has been "relegated to an advisory and legitimizing
function that is substantially different from the role of policy maker
and guardian of shareholder and public interest contemplated by
the law of corporations."93 Professor Alfred Conard, writing in 1976,
put it more sharply: "[Directors] do not supervise and control the
executives; rather, they are supervised and controlled by the
executives."94 Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan noted in
2002 that the problem continues: "Our vast and highly liquid
financial markets enable large institutional shareholders to sell
their shares when they perceive inadequacies of corporate gover-
nance, rather than fix them. This has placed de facto control in the
hands of the chief executive officer."95
One salient manifestation of control reversal is the widespread
United States practice of the CEO also serving as chair of the board
of directors. Under this peculiar arrangement, the chief agent to be
monitored also serves as the most influential person in the body
designed to monitor that agent. An agency law conception of the
90. Id. at 42.
91. Id. at 38-40.
92. See id. at 40.
93. Arthur J. Goldberg, Debate on Outside Directors, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1972, § 3, at 1.
94. ALFRED F. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 349-50 (1976).
95. Excerpts from Report by Greenspan at Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, § 3, at 8.
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board-officer relationship cogently highlights how bewildering and
unhealthy this practice really is.96
Several underlying reasons for the systemic reversal of control in
corporate governance have been identified. Professor Conard has
noted the inherent structural obstacles to directors being involved
more deeply in management.97 Directors do not sit continuously in
director capacity, nor, generally, do they make decisions promptly.9"
Professor Melvin Eisenberg summarizes the practical constraints on
directors exercising a more meaningful managerial role in corporate
governance as being those of limited time, limited information, and
a composition of members with interests that predispose them to
acquiesce to officer desires.99
From a deeper, sociological vantage point, Professor White argues
that this reversal of institutional power results because agency
relationships within complex organizations encourage specialization
of two kinds. 00 The first is "specialization in analytical skills,
whether through practice or training,"' 1 and the other is "special-
ization by localization,"'0 2 that is, the outcome of "accumulating
familiarity with the details of local situations."'0 ' Applying this
observation to the corporate milieu, it can readily be seen that
corporate officers not only gain important managerial expertise
throughout the trajectory of their careers, but, for those who rise
within the company, they also acquire firm-specific familiarity with
the details of the particular companies they manage as they gain
"promotion through the thicket of subexecutives, managers and
superintendents.""° This "local knowledge," and the dense intra-
corporate network of relationships built up over many years, cannot
96. See infra Part III.C.3.
97. See CONARD, supra note 94, at 349.
98. Id.
99. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 203-04
(8th ed. 2000). Professor White, however, believes it is "misleading" to focus on information
[alsymmetries as an explanation for the reversal of control problem. He believes that
"[alsymmetry in information is better thought of as a by-product and an implication of
asymmetry in control, rather than the cause of problems in control." White, supra note 70, at
204.
100. White, supra note 70, at 204-05.
101. Id. at 205.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. CONARD, supra note 94, at 353.
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be matched by directors meeting only several times a year, averag-
ing a mere 40 hours per year on director functions in the 1970s, and
in 2002, still spending only about 190 hours annually on director
duties.105
Reversal of control in principal-agent relationships, especially
those involving complex organizations, can eventually become so
pronounced that it "interfere[s] with the achievement of the pur-
poses for which the agency relationship was originally created."' °
Again, applying this insight in the corporate setting, we saw in the
1990s how immediate enrichment of executive officers through stock
options often came to supplant sustained corporate and stockholder
welfare as the paramount concern of too many corporate officers.0 7
In agency terms, they did not always act on behalf of the corpora-
tion.0 8 This emphasis on personal welfare over institutional well-
being may reflect an inevitable progression of control reversal, as
operational control-rightly in the hands of agents--evolves into the
realm of strategic control and control over the very goals of a
venture, and agents become ever more prominent as the principal
correspondingly recedes from view.0 9 Taking this dysfunctional
dynamic to its logical conclusion, perhaps we can see why the chief
105. Judith Burns, Everything You Wanted to Know About Corporate Governance, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at R6 (citing evidence gathered by Korn/Ferry International, a Los
Angeles-based executive firm, and comments by SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid).
106. White, supra note 70, at 205.
107. The Financial Economists Roundtable recently issued a report concluding that
widespread use of stock options to compensate senior officers "may have created incentives
for managers to manipulate company financial statements in order to drive up stock prices,
contributing to the recent corporate scandals." Statement, Financial Economists Roundtable,
The Controversy over Executive Compensation (Nov. 24, 2003), at httpJ/www.luc.edu/
orgs/finroundtable/statement03.pdf. SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman also has expressed
concern about this problem: "[It should be clear from the recent scandals that there is a risk
that some executives will manage to short-term performance goals to maximize their
compensation." SEC Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, Private and Public Sector Response
to Corporate Governance Issues, Comments Before the Conference on Bank Structure and
Competition (May 9, 2003), at http/www.sec.gov/news/speech/spchO5O9O3cag.htm. See
generally LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY (2001) (proposing that short-
term stock price maximization endangers the economic well-being of American society);
David Millon, Why Is Corporate Management Obsessed with Quarterly Earnings and What
Should Be Done About It?, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 890 (2002) (noting that managerial
shortsightedness may sacrifice potentially more lucrative opportunities that yield returns only
over the long-term).
108. See supra text accompanying note 30.
109. See White, supra note 70, at 205.
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executive officer, undoubtedly an agent in law, no longer is thought
of, or described in, those terms either within corporate governance
or in the larger corporate and business culture. Rather, when the
transformation of control is complete, it is no wonder that the
nomenclature of agency is so undeveloped in describing the status
of officers in corporate governance-it does not seem to reflect
reality. Instead, it can confidently and ironically be said that "[t]he
CEO is the principal, in effect.""'
D. Fiduciary Discourse Accommodates Reality
The striking dichotomy between the legal model of the director-
officer relationship, on the one hand, and institutional reality, on
the other hand, contributed to the non-development of agency
discourse for describing the fiduciary status of corporate officers.
As director and officer roles blurred, or even reversed, conceptions
of officer fiduciary status quite rapidly achieved the sui generis
status only gradually achieved by directors. Throughout the late
nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century, the
fiduciary status of directors was conceptualized in a variety of
bewildering ways in an effort to conform to preexisting legal
categories. Directors were described variously as "mandatories,"
"bailees," and "trustees," as well as "agents.""' None of these legal
classifications fit. Eventually, as noted by Rudolph Uhlman, writing
in 1939, many courts and commentators ended their futile taxo-
nomic efforts and simply emphasized "the fiduciary character of the
directors' office, instead of compressing it into one of the conven-
tional classifications." 2 Uhlman, presciently anticipating how
settled twentieth century law would eventually treat directors,
concluded that "the description of a director as a fiduciary is as fair
110. John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 1, 33 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985). SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson put the matter somewhat less
benignly in stating that too often CEOs have become "more of a monarch than a manager."
Donaldson, supra note 66; see also A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are
Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932) (noting that the "claims upon the
assembled industrial wealth and funneled industrial income which managements are then
likely to enforce (they have no need to urge) are their own").
111. See Uhlman, supra note 25, at 12-15.
112. Id. at 16.
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a characterization of his position as may be made under the
circumstances."" 3
As officers achieved greater hegemony in corporate governance
throughout the twentieth century, legally they could still properly
be classified as "agents""-unlike directors-and their fiduciary
duties could sensibly and easily be grounded on their agency status.
That description, however, wrongly suggested they were under the
control of the board." 5 Functionally, they were not. Moreover, until
the early 1970s, most corporate statutes provided that boards of
directors actually were to "manage" the corporation." 6 Directors,
therefore, were legally considered managers, although, in fact,
senior officers performed much of that function. Legal form
eventually yielded to institutional reality for directors, as corporate
statutes were amended to provide that the management function
need only be under the board's "direction." 7 For officers, their
formal legal status as agents continued "on the books" but withered,
as a point of emphasis, in the face of reality.
Furthermore, beginning at least with Berle and Means's land-
mark book published in 1932, it has been quite common in corporate
discourse to include both directors and officers within the non-legal
term "managers.""8 Berle and Means occasionally differentiate
113. Id. at 16-17.
114. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. Even in 1891, the United States Supreme
Court, although confused on the legal status of corporate directors, rightly described officers
as "agents of the corporation." Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 147 (1891).
115. See supra text accompanying note 30.
116. Section 8.01(b) of the Model Business Corporation Act was amended in 1974 to provide
what is essentially its current language, which reads that the corporation shall be managed
.under the direction of" the board. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.01 historical background
at 8-8 (3d ed. Supp. 2000-2002). Prior to that, it had provided that the business and affairs
of the corporation would be "managed by" the board of directors. Id. The wording was
amended out of a concern that the prior language "could be interpreted to mean that directors
must become involved in the detailed administration of the corporation's affairs." Id. In
sections 3.01 and 3.02, the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance,
adopted in 1992, seek more sharply yet to differentiate the functions of senior executives, who
are responsible for "management," from the functions of directors, who do not "manage."
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 3.01-3.02 (1992).
117. See supra note 32.
118. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86; see also ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW
23-24 (1986) (describing "centralized management"). Even as early as 1877, George W. Field's
treatise on corporation law noted that corporations usually conferred management authority
'upon a limited number of the members usually called directors or managers, who act, in most
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between directors and officers, but more often use the term "manag-
ers" or "management." They state, for example, that "managers
consist of a board of directors and the senior officers of the corpora-
tion." '19 In this description, they were faithful to the then-prevailing
legal model of corporate governance, which provided that directors
also "managed" the corporation's business. Functionally, however,
Berle and Means described "[mianagement" as those who have
"formally assumed the duties of exercising domination over the
corporate business and assets."2 ' That comes far closer to a
description of senior officers only, and not directors.
When, as was the case prior to the 1980s, most directors of public
corporations were also officers, such imprecision of expression may
have been understandable and of no great import. Once a majority
of directors were not officers, however, and once corporate statutes
were altered to negate the suggestion that directors also "manage,"
the term "managers" became profoundly inaccurate for directors.
Using the same term for two different bodies within corporate
governance dangerously suggests a "co-managing" relationship, and
such widespread usage may have further contributed to a dulling of
the idea that officers are subordinate to the board. In fiduciary duty
discourse, courts and commentators, perhaps having in mind the
functional rather than the legal status of officers, may pragmatically
have concluded, to paraphrase Uhlman's description of directors,
that "the description of ... [an officer] as a fiduciary is as fair a
characterization of his position as may be made under the circum-
stances.""' The result is that the distinctive agency rationale for
imposing fiduciary duties on officers largely disappears from
corporate law. In its place, officers and directors are routinely
lumped together as owing equivalent "fiduciary duties."'22 In
conventional fiduciary discourse, consequently, any sense that
officers are specifically accountable to the board, rather than
together with it, is lost.
respects ... as agents for and in place of the corporation, and of the stockholders." Morton J.
Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173,
215 (1985) (quoting GEORGE W. FIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
(1877)).
119. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 196.
120. Id.; see also Berle, supra note 110, at 1366-67 (describing corporate managers).
121. See Uhlman, supra note 25, at 16-17.
122. See supra notes 10, 49-55 and accompanying text.
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E. Corporate Theory Blurs Fiduciary Duties
The most important intellectual development in corporate law in
the last twenty years or so--the use of economic analysis- intro-
duced a particular conception of corporate relationships that
exacerbated the conflation of directors and officers in fiduciary
discourse. Drawing on the insights of financial economists who
conceive the business firm as a nexus of contracts, 23 many corporate
law scholars recast the core accountability concern in corporate
governance into a principal-agent "agency costs" issue.124 The nexus
of contracts theory disaggregated the corporation into a series of
contractual relations. 125 These relations were not literal, legal
contracts, but reciprocal exchange relationships.'26 One key
relationship-the one that corporate governance focuses on-is the
stockholder-manager relationship. Ironically, this relationship is
conceived of as a "principal-agent" relationship; 127 although by too-
123. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976),
reprinted in MICHAEL C. JENSEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 51 (1998);
Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375
(1983).
124. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 850,887 (1992). See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE,
CORPORATION LAw AND ECONOMICS 207 (2002) (relating "agency costs" to the larger problem
of achieving a proper balance between the need for board authority and accountability).
125. See Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215, 2219-22 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAw (1991) and ROBERT N. BELLAH ETAL.,
THE GOOD SOCIETY (1991)).
126. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of Contracts, and
the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819,822 (1998); see Clark, supra note 25, at 60-62.
127. Black, supra note 124, at 850 ("On the corporate manager side, what incentives do
corporate managers have to act as faithful agents of investors[?]"). More traditional
neoclassical economists, as well as financial economists, also occasionally described corporate
officers as "agents" of stockholders. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32 ('[A)
corporate executive is an employee of the owners of the business. He has direct responsibility
to his employers."). When economists describe a principal-agent relationship they mean,
generally, any relationship where one person or organization acts on behalf of another. See
PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 170, 214
(1992). Thus, both directors and officers are "agents" in this account. This economic theory of
agency is not the same as the legal concept of agency. BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW:
THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 45 (1997). This disjunction between discourses, coupled
with the fact that corporate law theory does not comport with positive law treatment of intra-
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readily collapsing any meaningful distinction between directors and
officers, through conceiving both as "agents" in relation to stockhold-
ers, the nexus conception in fact draws attention away from the only
true agency relationship in corporate governance: the corporation-
officer relationship. It does so in several ways.
First, by disaggregating the firm into a set of reciprocal relation-
ships, the corporation itself becomes an ethereal "nexus," a status
equivalent to nonexistence. 2 ' No one denies the juridical fact that,
in positive law, corporations are considered legal "persons."2 9 Yet,
in the nexus of contracts conception of relationships, the "corpora-
tion" is less significant than the stockholder who, as the residual
claimant on firm assets and cash flow, and bearing substantial risk,
is recast as the "principal." Oddly, this theoretical move restores
stockholders to the place of primacy they enjoyed in corporate law
in the mid-nineteenth century, before the strong governance role of
the board of directors was clearly differentiated and established. For
example, leading corporate law treatise writers stated in 1871 that
"[tihe power to appoint officers and agents rests, of course, like
every other power, in the body of the corporators [i.e., stockhold-
ers]. " "' Another treatise writer stated in 1877 that, absent other
provision, the power to manage corporate affairs belonged to the
stockholders.' 3 ' This nineteenth century conception of stockholders
as principals, however, necessarily gave way as the older view that
directors were agents yielded to the modern view that director
power was original and undelegated.'32 The modern "nexus of
contracts" and "principal-agent" theorists conceptually resurrect the
corporate relations, has created confusion in the fiduciary area.
128. See William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1498-1501, 1515 (1989).
129. See Santa Clara Co. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886); David Millon, Theories
of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 206 (1990).
130. Horwitz, supra note 118, at 215 (quoting JOSEPH K ANGELL & SAMUEL AMES,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS AGGREGATE 257 (9th ed. 1871)). Professor
Morton Horwitz points out that the 1861 edition of Angell and Ames's treatise did not have
a separate chapter on directors but treated directors in a chapter called "Agents of
Corporations," which lumped officers and directors together. Id.
131. Horwitz, supra note 118, at 215 (discussing FIELD, supra note 118); see also Union Pac.
R.R. v. Chicago R.R., 163 U.S. 564, 596 (1896) ("[W]hen the charter was silent, the ultimate
determination of the management of the corporate affairs rests with its stockholders....").
132. See supra notes 25, 111-13 and accompanying text.
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older view of stockholders as principals,'33 thereby demeaning the
board as the key actor on behalf of the corporate principal in
relation to officer-agents.
Second, having eliminated the "corporation" as "principal"-after
all, a "nexus" cannot be a "principal'-it remained for contractarian
theorists to identify the "agent." Would it be the board of directors
or the senior officers or both? Corporate statutes and case law (by
the 1970s) clearly established that directors of public corporations
were not expected to manage the corporation's business and
were not agents.'34 Officers, as noted before, are agents of the
corporation in positive law,'35 but the corporation was effaced in the
contractarian theory of the firm, awkwardly leaving officers as
agents of stockholders. Perhaps to soften the pointed clash between
this theoretical account of officers and their role in positive law, in
the contractarian view, the "agents" of the stockholders became the
"managers," a more ambiguous concept.'36 "Managers" were, and
are, routinely described to include directors and officers, often with
little or no distinction being made between them.'37 Lost again is the
notion that, although directors and officers are similar in that they
each ultimately act to further corporate and stockholders inter-
ests-and hence both frequently are referred to as "agents" in
finance literature-they differ in a critical way: officers are account-
able to directors. In relation to officers, directors are better under-
stood as acting on behalf of the principal, not as agents. Agency law
discourse with respect to an organizational principal should not,
133. As to the nineteenth century view of stockholders as principals, Berle and Means,
writing in 1932, stated that in this view:
The management of the corporation indeed was thought of as a set of agents
running a business for a set of owners; and while they could and did have wider
powers than most agents, they were strictly accountable and were in a position
to be governed in all matters of general policy by their owners.
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 86, at 125-26.
134. See supra notes 25, 116-17 and accompanying text. The board thus legally emerged
as a governance body distinct from both stockholders, on the one hand, and executive officers,
on the other hand, only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, promptly to
recede from a central managerial role in corporate governance throughout the twentieth
century.
135. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 118 and accompanying text; infra note 142 and accompanying text.
137. See Stout, supra note 25, at 672-73,689-90 (noting widespread description of directors
as "agents" in corporate law scholarship).
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either in theory or doctrine, frame the responsibilities or duties of
the principal's representative (the directors) in the same terms as
the duties of the agent (officers). Agency law does not. Agency law
concepts and terminology preserve and illuminate the critical
director-officer interaction attribute of corporate governance;
conventional fiduciary duty discourse within corporate law, recently
aided by the new economic theory of the firm, obscures it.
It is not the aim of this Article to assess the virtues and vices of
the financial economists' theory of corporate relationships.
138
Professor Robert Clark rather early on pointed out that it does not
accurately portray positive law." 9 Professor Melvin Eisenberg, 4 °
among others,' 4 1 notes that although the theory offers one way
to understand the voluntary elements of corporate interaction,
corporations can be conceived in other ways as well; for example,
they also operate by non-bargained-for bureaucratic rules and
hierarchical relations. The point here is that this important
theoretical understanding of corporateness, although using the
analytical rhetoric of agency, ironically served to mask the distinc-
tive agency role of corporate officers when it grouped them with
directors as "managers,"142 the latter term being foreign to positive
law discourse on corporate governance. The new corporate theory
did not originate the practice of grouping directors and officers
138. One point will be noted, however. Contractarians understand corporate law as a set
of mechanisms for reducing agency costs, these being the costs incurred by stockholders to
reduce shirking and self-dealing by agents. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 124, at 207 n.25.
Implicit in this view is the notion that stockholders have the power, subject only to cost
considerations, to discipline agents in various ways. Yet, the reversal of control critique,
described earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 78-92, operates at a deeper level and
challenges whether, in fact, a principal can control a specialized agent, especially, although
not exclusively, an agent in a complex organization. Little in corporate law today suggests
stockholders wield either the legal or the functional power to discipline (or alter) corporate
officers and their decisions.
139. See Clark, supra note 25, at 59-62; see also CHEFFINS, supra note 127, at 45 ("The
economic theory of agency costs must be distinguished from the legal concept of agency.").
140. See Eisenberg, supra note 126, at 820.
141. See Bratton, supra note 128, at 1501, 1515; Johnson, supra note 125, at 2219-21.
142. Professors Milgrom and Roberts, for example, group officers and directors together
when describing liability. See MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 127, at 279. The seminal
article by Jensen and Meckling, see supra note 123, also uses the term "managers" without
differentiating officers and directors. This appears to be the norm among financial economists.
Corporate law scholarship appears to follow that convention widely. Although directors, in
much of that scholarship, functionally are considered "agents" of shareholders in relation to
officers, the functional differences are not developed for fiduciary purposes.
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together for purposes of fiduciary duty discourse, but it did-
especially among scholars-exacerbate that practice and enhance its
legitimacy.
Overall, then, neither older or modern legal theory, nor older or
modern positive law in the fiduciary area, has done much to
preserve, much less highlight, the agency status of officers. Is this
just an interesting, if not odd, story of legal history, or does it
represent a significant loss? How does revisiting this issue in 2005
enhance corporate governance or shed light on contemporary issues
in corporate law? Part II takes up these questions.
II. AGENCY STATUS AND WHY IT MATTERS
Two responses to the dichotomy between the neglected legal
status and the functional reality of corporate officers are possible.
The legal status of officers as agents of the corporation might be
admitted, but regarded as a technical point only, one carrying no
promise for the larger project of restoring directors to a more
powerful position in relation to corporate officers. The other
response is to regard the agency status of officers as a promising
positive law foothold for advancing an important normative goal:
revitalizing the centrality of directors in corporate governance and
making senior officers more accountable. As recently put by former
Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey: "Statutory law provides that the
corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of the board
of directors. That means that the directors are in charge! They are
not merely advisors to the CEO. They are the people who hire and
fire the CEO."'43 Professor Conard put it even more tersely almost
thirty years ago: "[officers should] manage the business ... not
manage the board of directors."'"
This Article favors the second response. Corporate governance
reform in response to the scandals of the 1990s has come largely
from Congress,'45 the SEC, 46 the NYSE,'47 and Nasdaq. 148 These
143. Veasey, supra note 64, at 842 (footnote omitted).
144. CONARD, supra note 94, at 371.
145. See supra note 6.
146. See supra note 7.
147. See supra note 8.
148. See supra note 9.
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reforms have separately targeted directors and officers. 141 Virtually
no reform has come from states, the traditional source of corporate
law rules. Although often overlooked by corporate fiduciary law's
traditional emphasis on directors-itself an ironic state of affairs
given that officers are regarded as the real holders of institutional
power-agency law offers a set of substantive state law concepts
well-suited to aid in the larger project of redressing the power
imbalance between directors and officers. Toward the end of
reclaiming a role for agency law in the multi-front effort to redefine
director-officer relations in modem corporate governance,'150 this
Part first describes the fiduciary duties owed by officers as agents
to their corporate principals and then elaborates on why the
fiduciary status of officers is significant for contemporary corporate
governance.
A. The Fiduciary Duties of Officers
Agency is a consensual relationship that embodies fiduciary
obligations arising independently of contract.15' Even though
senior officers of corporations typically have employment agree-
ments, they still occupy a fiduciary status in relation to the
corporate principal.'52 As fiduciaries, officers owe several duties to
the corporation that exist independently of contract-although they
may, to a degree, be altered by agreement.'53 Breach of these duties
affords the corporate principal a host of remedies, including a tort
action against the agent for losses caused by the breach.'54 In effect,
breach of these duties enables the corporation to assert that it is the
victim of wrongdoing by the very persons who were to act on its
behalf.
149. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
150. See Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards,
State Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961 (2003) (describing federal
law, state law, and NYSE and Nasdaq listing standards as forming a new, collaborative
approach to corporate governance).
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
152. See KLEINBERGER, supra note 66, at 125 (stating "an agent typically owes duties in
contract as well as under agency law").
153. See id. at 122-23; see also GAB Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Lindsey & Newsom Claim Servs.,
Inc., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 665, 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that fiduciary duties of officers
arise independently of contract).
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 399.
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One cornerstone fiduciary duty owed by officers is a duty of
loyalty, which requires the agent to act solely for the benefit of the
corporate principal. 15 5 There are many aspects to the agent's duty of
loyalty. These include: not acting adversely to the principal without
consent;156 not acting on behalf of one with interests adverse to the
principal without consent; 157 not competing with the principal; 58 not
wrongly appropriating a corporate opportunity;5 9 providing an
accounting to the principal for profits;160 and not using or wrongly
communicating confidential information.' 6 ' Moreover, as with the
duty of loyalty for directors, an officer's duty may include not only
a "non-betrayal" dimension, but also a more affirmative "devotion"
aspect.6 2 This would require an officer to advance the well-being of
the company, not simply refrain from harming it.163 What has not
yet been required of an officer-unlike a director in a change of
control setting 4-is an overarching duty or a situation-specific duty
155. Id. § 387.
156. Id. §§ 389-390. A recent example involves the former President of Walt Disney
Company, Michael Ovitz. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch.
2003). Mr. Ovitz became President of Walt Disney Company before his employment
agreement was finalized. Id. at 281. As such, he was an agent with interests adverse to his
corporate principal and was subject to duties of loyalty and good faith, among others. Id. at
290. Ovitz recently failed to obtain a dismissal of the stockholder litigation against him
because of his alleged breach of fiduciary duty. See id. at 291. Although it might have done
so, the court did not ground Ovitz's fiduciary duties as president on agency principles.
Moreover, the alleged wrongdoing of the Chief Executive Officer, Michael Eisner, also could
easily have been based on breach of fiduciary duties owed as an agent of Walt Disney
Company.
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 391-392, 394.
158. Id. § 393.
159. See Northeast Harbor Golf Club, Inc. v. Harris, 661 A.2d 1146, 1152 (Me. 1995)
(adopting American Law Institute's approach regarding the usurpation of a corporate
opportunity by a fiduciary of the corporation). As both Professor Deborah DeMott and
Professor Jill Fisch pointed out to the authors, section 5.05 of the American Law Institute's
Principles of Corporate Governance, cited by the Harris court, does distinguish the scope of
an executive officer's duty with respect to a "corporate opportunity" from the duty of a non-
executive director. See id. at 1150-52.
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 388.
161. Id. §§ 395-396.
162. See Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law,
28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (2003); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (agent must
'act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his agency").
163. Johnson, supra note 162, at 40.
164. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del.
1994); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176, 179-80 (Del.
1986).
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to maximize the wealth of the corporation (or stockholders). Officers
are to be loyal, but they are not legally constrained or governed by
the stockholder wealth maximand. 165 Nor is it clear whether officers'
fiduciary duties extend to creditors when a firm enters the "vicinity
of insolvency," as is the case with directors. 6 ' Creditors, however,
might pursue the corporation's own claim-as wronged princi-
pal-in a bankruptcy context. 67
Besides owing a duty of loyalty, officers owe a duty of ordinary
care, 1 8 and simple negligence is a breach of this duty. '9 Additional
important duties include a duty of good conduct,170 a duty to provide
information and assist directors in understanding the significance
of reported information' 1 -which probably should entail a "duty of
165. This difference may make officers better candidates than directors for achieving both
fair and efficient outcomes, based on recent research by Professors Kent Greenfield and Peter
C. Kostant. Kent Greenfield & Peter Kostant,An Experimental Test ofFairness Under Agency
and Profit-Maximization Constraints (With Notes on Implications for Corporate Governance),
71 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 983, 1004-10 (2003) (finding that the director duty to maximize
stockholder wealth may alter conduct more than an actor's agency status).
166. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ.
A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 n.55 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
167. See, e.g., Sec. Investor Prot. Corp. v. R.D. Kushnir & Co., 267 B.R. 819, 824 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding securities firm's Vice President who acted as broker liable to former
employer and creditor for losses caused to employer's customers).
168. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 & cmt. (1958). The Restatement (Third)
of Agency, in section 8.08, provides that "[ulnless otherwise agreed, an agent has a duty to the
principal to act with the care, competence, and diligence normally exercised by agents in
similar circumstances...." RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF AGENCY § 8.08 (Council Draft No. 6, Sept.
30, 2004). Section 8.08 is the counterpart to section 379 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency. Id. reporter's notes.
169. Id.; see also Third Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, app. B
at 17, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2003), http'J/news.
corporate.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/enronbk72803xr3.pdf(adopting negligence standard
for application to Enron officers). Some commentators have stated that gross negligence is the
standard of conduct for officers as well as directors under Delaware law. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN
& JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIzATION AND FINANCE 151 (8th ed. 2003). We believe
Delaware has not squarely addressed the standard of care for officers.
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 380.
171. Id. § 381. In a recent case, a de facto CFO and the corporation's general counsel, both
agents, were held liable for not informing the board of directors that the CEO was taking
unauthorized loans at favorable interest rates. See Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449, 523-24
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). It is unclear from the opinion whether the general counsel was held liable
in his capacity as an officer or as a lawyer. Also, Vice Chancellor Leo Strine recently held
Richard Scrushy, former CEO of Healthsouth Corporation, liable on an innocent
misrepresentation theory, stating: "In the process of preparing and signing financial
statements, Scrushy necessarily represented to the company's board, audit committee, outside
auditors, and its public stockholders that the financial statements his management team had
1630
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availability" for open discussion with directors as well as the
reporting of "packaged" information172 -and a duty to obey the
principal,173 among others. 74 An agent who, for example, makes
misrepresentations to a third party on behalf of a corporation,
resulting in a claim by the third party against the corporation, has
breached one or more of these fiduciary duties and should be held
liable for resulting damages. 175 By way of contrast, a corporate
director owes fewer duties. These include a duty of loyalty (also
multi-faceted) and duties of due care and good faith.'76 The standard
of culpability in the director due care decision-making context is
also a looser standard of gross negligence, 7 7 not the ordinary
negligence standard applicable to agents.
One uncertainty concerning an officer's duty of care is whether
and how statutory specifications of standards for officers-for
example, section 8.42 of the Model Business Corporation Act 78 and
prepared were materially accurate in all respects." In re Healthsouth Corp. Sholders Litig.,
845 A.2d 1096, 1107 (Del. Ch. 2003). Moreover, the bankruptcy examiner in the Enron case
found that Enron's officers did not deliver all material information to the board and, "when
information was presented," it was "delivered in a manner not conducive to a full
understanding." Final Report of Neil Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, at 94, In re Enron
Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2003), http://www.enron.com/
corp.por/pdfs/examinerfinal/NBFinalExecutiveSummary.pdf; see also Wooddale, Inc. v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 378 F.2d 627, 634 (8th Cir. 1967) (stating that corporate
officer's failure to warn corporation of known wrongdoing constitutes breach of fiduciary duty).
172. "A recent survey of about 150 directors ... found that a majority wanted less packaged
information and more time for open discussions." Carol Hymowitz, How to Be a Good Director,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2003, at R1. The CEO and COO of Enron-Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey
Skilling, respectively-were criticized by the Bankruptcy Examiner because they "should have
used their knowledge of the company to help the Outside Directors understand the
information being presented." Final Report at 118, In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 385.
174. For a good, recent explanation of an agent's fiduciary duties, see KLEINBERGER, supra
note 66, at 117-28.
175. See Fasciana v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 829 A.2d 160, 173-74 (Del. Ch. 2003).
176. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001). The Enron Bankruptcy
Examiner stated that officers of Enron owed the same three duties as directors. See Third
Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, at 24-25, In re Enron Corp., No.
01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2003), httpJ/news.corporate.findlaw.com/hdocs/
docs/enron/enronbk7280xr3.pdf.
177. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
178. Model Business Corporation Act section 8.42, outlining standards of conduct for
officers, provides:
(a) An officer, when performing in such capacity, shall act:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care that a person in a like position would reasonably
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section 4.01 of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate
Governance' 79-alter the common law standard. By requiring an
officer to act in good faith, both the Model Act and the ALI import
into the officer duty context the burgeoning authority on good faith
now emerging in the director setting.8 0 This requirement of good
faith also qualifies an officer's statutory ability to rely on other
persons. 8' For example, officers who provide Sarbanes-Oxley
certification" 2 in reliance on assurances from more junior employees
or outside advisors may rely on those persons,'83 for state fiduciary
law purposes, only to the extent consistent with the officers'
obligation of good faith. Consequently, recklessness, dishonesty,
irrationality of action, and knowing violation of law, among other
wrongs, may negate good faith."M
exercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner the officer reasonably believes to be in the best interests
of the corporation.
(b) In discharging those duties an officer, who does not have knowledge that makes
reliance unwarranted, is entitled to rely on:
(1) the performance of properly delegated responsibilities by one or more
employees of the corporation whom the officer reasonably believes to be
reliable and competent in performing the responsibilities delegated; or
(2) information, opinions, reports or statements, including financial
statements and other financial data, prepared or presented by one or
more employees of the corporation whom the officer reasonably believes
to be reliable and competent in the matters presented or by legal counsel,
public accountants, or other persons retained by the corporation as to
matters involving skills or expertise the officer reasonably believes are
matters (i) within the particular person's professional or expert
competence or (ii) as to which the particular person merits confidence.
(c) An officer shall not be liable to the corporation or its shareholders for any
decision to take or not to take action, or any failure to take any action, as an officer,
if the duties of the office are performed in compliance with this section. Whether an
officer who does not comply with this section shall have liability will depend in such
instance on applicable law, including those principles of § 8.31 that have relevance.
2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.42 (3d ed. Supp. 1998-1999).
179. See AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 (1994).
180. See Johnson & Sides, supra note 6, at 1200-05; Sale, supra note 10, at 459-60.
181. See supra note 178; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.02.
182. See Johnson & Sides, supra note 6, at 1220.
183. See supra note 178.
184. See Johnson & Sides, supra note 6, at 1201-04 (discussing the various wrongdoings
that may negate compliance with the duty of good faith).
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Importantly, the Model Act's section 8.42, notwithstanding the
general caption,'85 is, like section 4.01 of the ALI's Principles of
Corporate Governance, a statutory duty of care only.'86 Violations of
the duty of loyalty and other duties of an agent, therefore, are not
governed by this statute. The statute essentially adopts a "reason-
able care" standard of behavior. It also states that an officer will
not be liable if he or she complies with the statutory standard.8 7
As to whether noncompliance will lead to liability, the statute
refers to "applicable law, including those principles of § 8.31 that
have relevance."'88 The reference to "applicable law" is murky. If
"applicable law" means agency law-which it should' 89
-under
established agency principles, the agent is clearly liable to the
principal for any damage caused'by the agent's breach of duty. 9 °
Moreover section 8.31-the director liability statute founded on
policy rationales specifically pertinent to directors-should not be
applied to lower the standards for senior officers with substantial
operational responsibilities. Here, the failure to distinguish the
officer as a fiduciary due to agency status-not facing the informa-
tion or time hindrances of a director,' 91 receiving considerably
greater compensation than the typical outside director,'92 and not
being "independent" in relation to the corporation-and a director
with somewhat more distant and episodic responsibilities, is
striking. A corporate director should be held to a lower stan-
dard-whether as low as section 8.31 is another issue-than a
185. See supra note 178.
186. See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30 official cmt. at 8-162 (3d ed. Supp. 1998-
1999) ("This standard of conduct is often characterized as a duty of care.").
187. See supra note 178.
188. 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.42 (3d ed. Supp. 1998-1999).
189. The official comment to section 8.42 refers to the "principles of agency" and specifically
references section 379 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. § 8.42 official cmt. at 8-264. This point is reinforced in the introduction to the Model
Act's treatment of director conflicts of interest where it is stated as follows: "Conflicts of
interest of non-director officers or employees of the corporation are dealt with by the law of
agency prescribing loyalty of agent to principal." 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN., ch. 8, subch.
f, introductory cmt. at 8-374 (3d ed. Supp. 1997).
190. See supra text accompanying note 154.
191. See supra notes 97-99, 105 and accompanying text.
192. Median total direct compensation for chief executive officers at major U.S.
corporations was just over $3 million in 2002. Joann S. Lublin, Executive Pay Keeps Rising,
Despite Outcry, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2003, at B1. By way of contrast, directors at Fortune 1000
firms were paid an average of $89,000 in 2002. Bums, supra note 105.
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highly compensated senior officer with significant, ongoing, front-
line managerial responsibilities.
The ALI devotes only a single cryptic paragraph in support of
applying the same duty of care to officers and directors.'93 It states,
wrongly we believe, that "it is relatively well settled ... that officers
will be held to the same duty of care standards as directors."'94 We
believe such an assertion is not at all well settled and, in fact, is
false. The ALI comment goes on to assert, again wrongly we believe,
that "[s]ound public policy points in the direction of holding officers
to the same duty of care and business judgment standards as
directors."'95 As noted above, we believe policy considerations point
to quite different standards for officers and directors, given their
quite different roles, compensation, responsibilities, and overall
position within the corporation.
The application of these officer fiduciary duties, as always is the
case with fiduciary duties, will be influenced by the specific facts
and circumstances in which the officer conduct arises. In addition,
duties may vary depending on the particular office to reflect
appropriate expectations concerning the professional skills and
technical competence typically associated with the position--e.g.,
the positions of chief financial officer and general legal counsel.'96
Moreover, just as officer operational duties are generally more
expansive than those of directors, so too an officer's duties may vary
based on the propriety of his or her reliance on another officer in a
particular setting.
As noted earlier, only rarely do courts even address fiduciary duty
claims against officers in their capacity as officers.9 7 Furthermore,
when they do so it is rarer still for them to ground fiduciary duties
on the agency status of officers. We have identified only five cases
over the past twenty years-none of which came from Delaware and
only one of which involved a public company-that link a corporate
193. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 cmt. a, at 140 (1992).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Comm. on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act Pertaining
to the Standards of Conduct for Officers; Inspection, Rights and Notices-Final Adoption, 54
Bus. LAW. 1229, 1230 (1999).
197. See supra notes 46, 56 and accompanying text.
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officer's fiduciary duty of care to the officer's status as an agent.198
Only three cited the standard of care set forth in the Restatement
(Second) of Agency,199 and one of those three held that the business
judgment rule overrode an agent's fiduciary duty and shielded a
manager from liability for remarkable carelessness.2 °0 A fourth
decision inexplicably applied a gross negligence standard rather
than the customary standard of ordinary care.20 In existing
decisional law, it is not the case, as with directors, that there are
many reported cases with plaintiffs only rarely prevailing; rather,
with respect to officers, there are very few reported decisions at all.
It is clear that the strong fiduciary duties associated with the
agency status of corporate officers are having very little impact on
judge-made law.
B. The Significance of Agency Status
1. The State Law Foundation
Unless state corporate law is simply going to cede responsibility
for regulating corporate officers to the federal government, state
law, through fiduciary duty law, must give a compelling account of
why officers are expected to behave in certain ways. Even Congress
in assigning responsibilities to corporate officers in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act must have been building on some unspoken conception of
why officers should be assigned certain functions. Agency law
provides a state law framework for those expectations. This is even
more important today with the new calls for director "independ-
198. See Shields v. Cape Fox Corp., 42 P.3d 1083, 1091 (Alaska 2002); Potter v. Pohlad, 560
N.W.2d 389, 394 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); OmniBank of Mantee v. United S. Bank, 607 So.2d
76, 84 (Miss. 1992); Brown v. United Cerebral Palsy, 650 A.2d 848, 851 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1994); Para-Medical Leasing, Inc. v. Hangen, 739 P.2d 717, 722 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
For a somewhat older case addressing an officer's fiduciary duty in relationship to agency
principles, see Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 935 & n.10 (Cal. 1966). Loyalty
cases were few and far between as well. See, e.g., Jordan v. Hunter, 865 P.2d 990, 995-96
(Idaho Ct. App. 1993) (stating that officer owes duty of loyalty as agent); Hayes v.
Schweikart's Upholstering Co., 402 S.W.2d 472, 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1965) (asserting that
officer owes higher degree of loyalty than required by employment contract).
199. See Shields, 42 P.3d at 1091; Brown, 650 A.2d at 849; Para-Medial Leasing, 739 P.2d
at 722.
200. Para-Medical Leasing, 739 P.2d at 722.
201. See Potter, 560 N.W.2d at 392.
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ence." °2 The result is likely to be fewer officers serving on boards
of directors. As to non-director officers-a growing group-some
theoretical basis for the imposition of fiduciary duties must,
therefore, be articulated.
2. Fiduciary Duty
The rediscovery of the agency status of corporate officers is
important to the fiduciary duty dimension of corporate governance.
Currently there is simply no widely recognized conceptual ground-
ing for the frequent doctrinal assertions that officers are fiduciaries.
One might regard officer fiduciary status as sui generis, as is the
case with directors, but there is no reason to do so. Officers undoubt-
edly are agents, and agents undoubtedly owe an array of fiduciary
duties. Agency law, therefore, provides a pre-existing set of
expectations that, although perhaps needing modification for
adaptation to the modern corporation," 3 does not require "starting
from scratch" in fleshing out officer duties.
Forgetting agency law's presence in corporate law leads, for
example, to Professors Robert Thompson and Hillary Sale's
observation:
State law actually says very little affirmatively about what
officers are supposed to do (in contrast to the relatively well-
developed roles of directors and shareholders.) [By way of
contrast,] Congress expressed its clear intent, through the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, to regulate the conduct of officers, in the
context of the duties of care, loyalty, and good faith.2"4
Recalling agency law concepts reveals that state law, in fact, says a
great deal about the fiduciary duties of officers. Although it may or
may not be better, as a normative or policy matter, to refine the
202. See supra notes 8-9.
203. See Langevoort, supra note 11, at 1213-30 (urging caution in applying agency law
attribution of knowledge rule).
204. Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism, 56VAND. L. REv. 864,886 (2003). Professors Thompson and Sale
also argue that federal securities law cases "are working to fill the hole in Delaware law
brought about by the lack of liability for, and concomitant inability to sustain, suits for
breaches of the (officer] fiduciary duty of care." Id. at 905.
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manner in which agency rules operate in corporate governance,
positive law imposes the fiduciary duties of agency law on corporate
officers. At the very least, this means the agency law duties of care
and loyalty for senior officers are an integral, constituent part of
corporate governance.
Appreciating this idea has potentially wide-ranging significance
for the liability of senior officers. The duty of loyalty polices, among
other wrongdoings, conflicts of interest and deliberate dishonesty.2 °5
At least as important is the agent's duty of care. This obligation
should hinder the efforts of senior officers to assert innocence based
solely on ignorance in cases of wrongdoing by subordinates. Failure
to exercise due care in such cases would give rise to a cause of
action. In addition, as discussed above, agency law imposes an
ordinary negligence standard of care that is tougher than the "gross
negligence" standard applicable to corporate directors.20 6
What this means in practical terms is, of course, highly context-
specific, like the duty of care in the torts setting. There is no doubt,
however, that this duty imposes on the appropriate senior officers
the responsibility for establishing adequate internal monitoring
procedures, including a system of financial controls sufficient to
detect accounting improprieties and errors, as well as outright
misappropriation of funds. Senior officers cannot blindly accept
financial reporting from subordinates without some reason to have
confidence in its reliability. Senior officers themselves owe the
corporation a strong duty of care that they cannot discharge by
leaving it up to the outside auditor or the audit committee of the
board to vet financial statements for accuracy. In addition, senior
officers need to ensure the existence of informational systems that
are capable of revealing other kinds of illegal activities.20 7
As agents of the corporation, officers bear primary responsibility
for stewardship of the corporation's business activities and financial
reporting. The board of directors' role then is to monitor senior
officers' discharge of those duties. It is now clear that the board of
205. See supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 168-69, 177 and accompanying text.
207. Cf In re Caremark Int'l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(addressing board monitoring duties but oddly neglecting the role of senior officers). Justice
Holmes, in Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524, 529-30 (1919), imposed liability for a subordinate's
wrongdoing on the corporation's president but not on the other directors. See supra note 56.
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directors, meeting only occasionally and lacking intimate knowledge
of the corporation's activities, is incapable of managing the publicly
held corporation in a direct manner. Statutes like Delaware's
section 141(a) acknowledge this fact of corporate life, but also seem
to imply that the board has somehow delegated its own managerial
responsibility to the senior officers. Delaware's statute, for example,
speaks in terms of management "by or under the direction of" the
board.2"' Appreciating that senior officers are agents of the corpora-
tion should remind us that their fiduciary duties are original and
derive from agency law, not from the board's delegated statutory
mandate to oversee the corporation's business and affairs.
Recalling the agency status of officers also reveals that the
fiduciary duty of care is no interloper in corporate law. Professors
Edward Rock and Michael Wachter argue that the duty of care for
directors has proven "troublesome" to corporate law as a "trans-
plant" from the law of trusts and agency, 209 leading courts to subdue
its enforcement through the business judgment rule.2 10 With
respect to corporate officers, however, no "transplant" into corporate
law occurred or was necessary. Agency law was there all along,
and, together with its robust duty of care, vitally shapes the
officers' relationship to the corporation. As chronicled in this Article,
corporate law's longstanding "neglect" of this status might arguably
serve the same function with respect to the duty of care for officers
as did judicial curbing of director care by means of the business
judgment rule. Such a claim, however, is the exact opposite of that
advanced by Rock and Wachter with respect to directors. Applied to
corporate officers, the argument would be that a doctrine clearly
already in corporate law must for some reason be expelled, whether
by neglect or otherwise. That case has never been made.
208. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
209. See Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law,
and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651 (2002).
210. Id. at 666-68. The business judgment rule, however, applies only where a deliberate
judgment has been made. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984) (noting that the
rule operates only in the context of director action). It therefore affords no protection within,
and has no application to, the substantial sphere of director responsibility where no decision
is made.
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3. Officer Liability
Properly characterizing officers as agents carries strong potential
for personal liability for breach of duty, particularly the duty of care.
Currently most states,21' including Delaware,212 allow stockholders
to reduce or eliminate director monetary liability for breaching the
duty of due care. Most states do not extend this protection to
officers. Delaware, for example, does not.21 3 Companies thus cannot
by charter limit this exposure. A breach of due care by an officer-if
an officer is regarded as an agent-may still result in an award of
money damages.214 Moreover, in Delaware at least, the culpability
standard for directors is gross negligence,2 5 whereas the customary
standard of care for agents is that of ordinary care or simple
negligence,21 6 a stricter fiduciary standard. Not only are officers thus
held to a higher standard of care than directors, but unlike directors
they may also be personally liable for breaching that standard. This
fact, coupled with a 2004 change in Delaware law to provide for
personal jurisdiction over corporate officers, 7 may lead to renewed
attention to the development of distinctive fiduciary rationales for
the liability of officers. Recalling the agency status of officers
supplies that rationale. Lumping directors and officers together as
generic "fiduciaries," by way of contrast, leads to neglect of that
important status.
The heightened standard of care for corporate officers does not
mean directors will routinely use litigation to pursue remedies for
officer breaches of duty.21 8 It does accord directors considerable
211. See 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.02, official cmt. at 2-31 (3d ed. Supp. 2000-
2002).
212. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., Pereira v. Cogan, 294 B.R. 449, 534 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that
exculpatory clause in articles of incorporation does not provide protection for officers for
breach of fiduciary duty).
215. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 & official cmt. (1958).
217. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (2003).
218. Litigation against officers or former officers may become more common, however, as
directors appreciate that pursuing (or considering, at least) such claims may comprise part
of their own fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Charles Forelle, CA Investors Weigh Plan on Scandal-
Tainted Pay, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 2004, at B7 (detailing demand of Computer Associates'
shareholders that board seek to recoup payments made to executives and detailing how board
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leverage in their dealings with officers, however, and that leverage
goes beyond the bargained-for terms of an employment agreement.
Although tightly written employment contracts can make it very
difficult to terminate senior officers "for cause,"219 breaches of
fiduciary duty create liability independently of contract. Improper
behavior not warranting termination "for cause," thus may,
nonetheless, constitute a fiduciary duty breach according the
principal various remedies. These, in turn, may alter the balance of
power in favor of the corporation in negotiating a severance
arrangement. °
This leverage, when fully appreciated, will open a host of other
issues. Senior officers may, before assuming office, seek to contract
around agency-based liability by insisting on broad exculpation
provisions in their employment agreements, specifically negating
certain fiduciary duties (within the limits of public policy), relaxing
the standard for discharging the fiduciary duty of care (and other
duties), or eliminating monetary liability for breach of duties. A
review of the employment agreements of Richard Grasso, former
President of the NYSE, and Charles Conaway, former CEO of
Kmart, reveals no efforts to contract around fiduciary obligations.221
of Nortel Networks Corporation was demanding repayment of bonuses from fired executives);
Rebecca Smith, DPL Sues 3 Top Executives Who Quit Under Cloud, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25,
2004, at B2 (detailing DPL's lawsuit against former executives for breach of contract and
breach of fiduciary duty).
219. Lublin, supra note 57. Professors Stewart Schwab and Randall Thomas found that the
most common grounds for "just cause" termination of a CEO, based on their review of 375
employment agreements, were moral turpitude (72.27% of all contracts), willful misconduct
(69.07%), failure to perform duties (57.87%), and fiduciary breach (50.67%). STEWART J.
SCHWAB & RANDALL S. THOMAS, WHAT Do CEO'S BARGAIN FOR?: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF KEY
LEGAL COMPONENTS OF CEO EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS (Vanderbilt Univ. Law School, Law &
Econ. Working Paper No. 04-12, 2004), available at http-//ssrn.comabstract-id=529923.
220. Lublin, supra note 57 (describing the backlash against paying severance compensation
to departing executives who engaged in wrongdoing). Although Professors Schwab and
Thomas found that only about half of their sample employment contracts allowed a "just
cause" termination for breach of fiduciary duty, SCHWAB & THOMAS, supra note 219, at 25,
breach of duty would still subject the CEO to various remedies, whether or not it constituted
'cause" for termination. Moreover, Professors Schwab and Thomas found that "poor
performance" was not included as cause for termination in most CEO contracts. Id. Such
conduct, however, would likely constitute a breach of an agent's fiduciary duty of ordinary
care.
221. Professors Schwab and Thomas did not examine the frequency of CEOs contracting
around fiduciary duties, except as a possible basis for a "cause" termination. They did find
that most CEOs terminated for cause received no severance payment. SCHWAB & THOMAS,
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Consequently, depending on the facts of those organizations'
disputes with their former chief officers, fiduciary duty claims may
exist.
Where there is attempted contracting around fiduciary duty, this
invites a question as to the propriety of one fiduciary, the board of
directors, relaxing the obligations of another fiduciary, senior
officers. This issue is not present with director exculpation because
stockholders themselves choose that outcome, not, as in the case
with officers, directors who themselves owe fiduciary duties.
Moreover, corporate lawyers, who now presumably fully explain
director fiduciary duties, need to consider whether they must
separately explain the contours of officer fiduciary duties.2 Even
though corporate counsel does not represent corporate officers,
223
summarizing expected fiduciary duties to an agent may comprise
part of a lawyer's competent representation of the corporate princi-
pal's interests.
Furthermore, if directors choose not to pursue a valid breach of
fiduciary duty claim against an officer--electing to drop it alto-
gether or to resolve the matter in some other way-the question
arises whether stockholders may initiate a derivative action. The
action undoubtedly would challenge not only the directors' handling
(or neglect) of the officer breach as itself a breach of director duty,
but also seek to vindicate the underlying corporate claim against
the breaching officer.224 Directors in that case may be sufficiently
self-interested that demand on the board is excused.225 Directors,
supra note 219, at 26.
222. Surely something is wrong if the former President of Disney, Michael Ovitz, testifies
that he understood "duty of care" only in the context of a hospital. See Rita K Farrell, Disney
Directors on Trial for a Payout, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2004, at C1O.
223. Professors Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and Edward B. Rock recently noted the inherent
awkwardness of a corporate general counsel's relationship with, on the one hand, directors,
and, on the other hand, officers: "The general counsel's relationship with the management
team is precisely what gets in the way of the general counsel ("GC") guiding the independent
directors through their governance obligations." Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock,
A New Player in the Boardroom: The Emergence of the Independent Directors' Counsel, 59 Bus.
LAW. 1389, 1404 (2004) (analyzing the growing use of separate legal counsel for independent
directors).
224. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 291 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(denying motions to dismiss derivative action against directors and former president); see also
supra note 156 (examining In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation).
225. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d. 805, 815 (Del. 1984).
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accordingly, must from the outset handle alleged officer fiduciary
breaches in a manner that discharges their own fiduciary duties.
They will not do so if the existence of officer duties-grounded in
agency law-is not first brought to their attention.
4. The Business Judgment Rule
A claim that an officer breached a fiduciary duty will invite
consideration of whether officers should receive the benefit of the
business judgment rule when their conduct is judicially reviewed.226
There are fewer policy justifications for applying the business
judgment rule to officers than directors,227 just as there are policy
factors supporting greater liability risk for officers, compared to
directors. Officers work full-time and receive significantly greater
compensation than do directors, lessening the likelihood that they
will decline to serve, or be deterred from taking risks, due to
liability exposure. Their reward/risk ratio is higher than for
directors, as is their overall level of responsibility. One would
expect, given positive law and these policy factors, that officers
would face a higher overall incidence of actual liability and a higher
comparative incidence of liability than outside directors face. 228 Yet,
they do not. This suggests other factors, some of which we identified
earlier,229 may be mitigating liability risk while raising the issue of
whether we can conclude that such an outcome reflects a healthy
and optimal level of exposure. Perhaps officers should face higher
risk as legal theory suggests, but decisional law does not support
that outcome.
Without the benefit of the business judgment rule-or some other
method to reduce liability risk-an officer's breach of duty leads
straightforwardly to liability, avoiding the complexity of Delaware's
current approach to judicial review of director conduct23 ° and the
226. See Lyman Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW.
(forthcoming Feb. 2005) (discussing issue in depth).
227. See id.
228. See BLACK ET AL., supra note 21, at 66 (describing liability exposure of directors).
229. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995). For a
critique of the unnecessary and faulty complexity introduced into fiduciary duty analysis by
the Cinerama case, see Lyman Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 787 (1999).
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odd dichotomy between the standard of director conduct and the
standard of judicial review."' The point here, however, is that one
gets to the business judgment rule issue-and the policy question of
how much discretion it should accord officers--only after there is a
clear underlying basis for imposing liability on corporate officers in
the first place. Agency law provides that basis.
C. Corporate Governance Implications
1. Officers' Duty to the Corporate Enterprise
Much has been written about the appropriate content of directors'
duties. Longstanding doctrine,"' as well as certain theoreticalexplorations,233 suggest a "shareholder primacy" understanding,
according to which the board should attend first and foremost to the
interests of shareholders whenever those interests conflict with
those of non-shareholder constituent groups such as corporate
employees, creditors, or local communities in which the company
operates. Meanwhile, however, recent doctrinal developments
suggest a broader conception of the director's role as mandating, or
at least permitting, regard for the well-being of all of the corpora-
tion's stakeholders, including shareholders as well as non-share-
holders.2 34 Legal theorists have offered arguments in support of this
231. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993). This "divergence"
account of fiduciary duty analysis seems to have influenced not only Delaware law, but also
the revised Model Business Corporation Act's Byzantine treatment of director conduct. See
2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.31 cmt. at 8-196 (3d ed. Supp. 1998-1999) (referencing
Professor Eisenberg's divergence account).
232. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668,684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business corporation
is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholder.").
233. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 125, at 91 (1991) (describing corporate
managers as "agents of the equity investors"); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay,
The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 440-41 (2001) (describing the
"standard shareholder-oriented" model).
234. Twenty-nine states have enacted statutes that expressly empower boards of directors
to consider interests other than those of shareholders in exercising their decision-making
powers. These "constituency" or "directors' duty" statutes vary in detail, but all include lists
of specific non-shareholder constituencies, such as employees, creditors, or local communities
in which corporations operate. See generally David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND.
L. REV. 223 (1991) (examining directors' duty statutes, doctrinal implications to shareholder
primacy, and the extent to which the statutes affirmatively compel managment to protect the
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view.235 At the moment, this important question awaits a definitive
doctrinal or theoretical resolution.
This question should not arise in the case of senior officers. It is
indisputable that officers are agents for the corporate enterprise,
not the stockholders. Their responsibility to any particular corporate
constituency is only indirect, and any benefits (or costs) to such
groups are incidental effects that flow from decisions made in the
interest of the corporation as a single, undifferentiated entity.
Certainly agency theory provides no basis for the view that duties
flow primarily to shareholders and that conflicts of interest between
that group and any corporate constituency be resolved in favor of
the former.
Seeing the matter in this way only begs the difficult question of
what it means to conceive of officers' duties as running to the
corporation. Is corporate profit-maximization (whether pursued
interests of non-shareholders); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework
for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEx. L. REV. 579 (1992) (analyzing corporate
constituency statutes and their relationships to emerging case law). In a similar vein, at least
in the special case of a board's response to certain types of hostile takeover bids, the Delaware
Supreme Court has stated that directors might take into account "the impact [of the takeover]
on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps
even the community generally)." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985).
235. So-called "progressive" corporate law scholars, critical of corporate law's traditional
commitment to shareholder primacy, have advanced this position. For a representative
collection of papers, see PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed. 1995); see
also Johnson, supra note 125 (contrasting Easterbrook and Fischel's "contractual" model of
the corporation with Bellah's more "organic" conception); Millon, supra note 234; Mitchell,
supra note 234 (analyzing trend toward legal recognition of non-shareholder constituency
interests); Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts:
Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189 (1991)
(arguing that corporations should be legally responsible for alleviating the harsh effects that
corporate restructuring has on employees). For criticism of these views, see Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive
Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 (1997) (reviewing PROGRESSIVE
CORPORATE LAW, supra). Professors Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout have criticized the
shareholder primacy norm on different grounds, using economic analysis to argue for a
conception of the board of directors as mediator among the interests of the various
participants in corporate production. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999). For criticism of their
argument from a progressive point of view, see David Millon, Essay, New Game Plan or
Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV.
1001 (2000) (questioning descriptive validity of team production model and distinguishing its
normative implications from progressive reform proposals).
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with a short-term or longer-term focus) consistent with a notion of
the corporation as an enterprise consisting of numerous partici-
pants, each of whose well-being affects the well-being of the
corporation as a whole? Neglect of the idea that officers are agents
of the corporation both explains and reflects the absence of careful
thinking about this difficult question. Respect for officers' agency
status demands that this oversight be addressed.
An appreciation of officers' status as agents of the corporate
principal clarifies the appropriate standard governing the board's
exercise of its authority. If the officers are supposed to act on behalf
of the corporate entity-which comprises more than just the
shareholders-it makes no sense to conceive of directors' fiduciary
duties solely in terms of the shareholders. In addition to its own
decision-making authority, the board is also charged with responsi-
bility for monitoring the performance of the corporation's senior
officers. A monitor held to one standard cannot impose its views
of right conduct on agents whose responsibilities are defined
differently. The result would be incoherent conceptually and
unworkable as a practical matter. Instead, it should be understood
that directors, in the discharge of their monitoring function, should
evaluate officer performance by reference to the well-being of the
corporation as a whole. A different metric-such as shareholder
primacy-arguably could then guide the board's own decision-
making functions. There would be a conceptual disconnect, perhaps,
but the result would not be incapable of implementation.
2. Division of Governance Responsibilities
Agency law not only provides a conceptual grounding for officer
fiduciary duties, but also offers a way to differentiate the gover-
nance functions of officers and directors, something too often
blurred in corporate law and theory. Distinguishing director and
officer functions enhances the larger project of revitalizing the
board's central function in corporate governance-responsibility for
monitoring the overall welfare of the company by meaningfully
assuring that corporate officers advance firm interests. This is true,
moreover, whether one believes that the board of directors should
function primarily as a monitor seeking to advance stockholder
interests or as a mediator concerned with balancing a broader set of
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constituent interests vital to enterprise well-being. Although an
investor-centered model and an enterprise-centered model may
differ in other ways bearing on board composition and function,236
enhancing healthy director interaction with senior officers through
sharper role differentiation is important under either board model.
To be sure, however, conceiving of officers as agents of the enter-
prise should strengthen the position that the board itself must also
act for the good of the enterprise as a whole, not simply on behalf of
stockholders.23
In post-Enron corporate governance, most regulatory reform has
aimed to improve the board's functioning as an oversight/monitoring
body. This is true in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,23s SEC governance
rulemaking, 23 NYSE and Nasdaq rules,24 ° and various "blue ribbon"
studies.2" These efforts seek to revitalize a movement that began
thirty years ago, after the release of Professor Mace's distressing
study of board dysfunction and the revelation of various corporate
scandals.242 The aim was to improve board performance by reducing
the size of the board, increasing the number of "independent"
directors, and urging directors to reassert themselves more
prominently in strategic planning and policymaking. By 1989,
Professors Jay Lorsch and Elizabeth MacIver found that CEOs had
236. See ALLEN KAUFMAN ET AL., A TEAM PRODUCTION MODEL OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
REVISITED (George Washington Univ. Sch. of Bus. and Pub. Mgmt., SMPP Working Paper 03-
03, 2003), available at httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract=410080.
237. See Stout, supra note 25, at 687. Professor Bainbridge's "director primacy" model of
corporate governance conceives of the board not as an agent of the stockholders but as
embodying the interests of the corporate principal. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547 (2003);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOwA L. REV. 1
(2002). Although Bainbridge also believes, see Bainbridge, supra, at 563, that stockholders
should be the beneficiaries of director efforts-a distinct and non-essential element, in our
view, of a director-centered model--our agency conception of corporate officers supports
Bainbridge's model of decision-making power in corporate governance.
238. See supra note 6.
239. See supra note 7.
240. See supra notes 8-9.
241. See, e.g., THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2002);
THE CONFERENCE BD. COMMON ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 29-42 (2003).
242. See Mace, supra note 69; see also DAVID VOGEL, LOBBYING THE CORPORATION: CITIZEN
CHALLENGES TO BUSINESS AUTHORITY (1978) (describing corporate reform efforts being taken
directly to firm management).
1646 [Vol. 46:1597
20051 RECALLING WHY CORPORATE OFFICERS ARE FIDUCIARIES 1647
substantially less control over boards than earlier.243 This institu-
tional realignment of power was thought by many financial
theorists to be aided greatly by the influence of powerful market
forces curbing officer misconduct, including pressures arising in
product and service markets, labor markets, and capital markets.
2
"
In addition, the 1990s saw an upsurge in activity by institutional
investors,2 45 including the advocacy of even greater influence by
independent directors.
Yet, notwithstanding those widespread reforms and the appeal of
market-based constraints, CEO compensation and CEO control over
compensation dramatically increased in the 1990s, as did corporate
wrongdoing involving senior officers." 6 Pay increases for CEOs not
only skyrocketed in absolute terms, but the rate of increase also
outstripped increases for other officers.247 One reason, now well
known, is the rise of the stock option in CEO compensation, with its
tendency to induce excessive focus on short-term stock price
movements.2 48 By linking compensation to share price, it also led to
efforts to manipulate financial data to overstate firm profitability.249
Designing better managerial incentives to advance corporate and
investor interests is part of needed reform.
Several of the current reform efforts involve, as well, seeking to
reestablish board power over corporate affairs to prevent officer
misconduct. Congressional, SEC, and SRO rules all impose, in an ad
hoc fashion, additional responsibilities at the director or officer
level, thought necessary due to defects at the state law or market
level. Violating these new mandates, however, carries no private
cause of action.25 ° Fiduciary duty breaches, by way of contrast, do
243. See LORSCH & MACIVER, supra note 69, at 75-96.
244. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
YALE L.J. 698, 701 (1982); Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND.
L. REv. 1259, 1263-64 (1982).
245. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 124, at 514-15 (describing academic interest in
institutional investor activism).
246. See supra note 2.
247. See KAUFMAN ET AL., supra note 236, at 5-6.
248. See supra note 107.
249. See Final Report of Neil Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, at 90-91, In re Enron
Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2003), httpJ/www.enron.com/corp/por/
pdfs/examinerfinal/NBFinalExecutiveSummarypdf. See generally Millon, supra note 107
(analyzing incentive structures that have rewarded accounting fraud).
250. See Johnson & Sides, supra note 6, at 1152 n.14.
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support private claims for damages against officers. More funda-
mentally yet, contemporary reform efforts, like the earlier initia-
tives on which they build, fail to articulate an underlying theoretical
understanding of the officers' governance role or fiduciary status.
The current regulatory effort to reassert--again-the primacy of
the board would be enhanced greatly by conceiving of officers as
agents of the corporation owing fiduciary duties. Even contractarian
theorists, who disaggregate the "firm" into a nexus of contracts,
view stockholder-manager relations as requiring a strong set of
fiduciary rules to supplement the principal's need to monitor the
agent.2"' This theoretical call for fiduciary duties held great promise
for re-emphasizing the fiduciary duties of officers as agents but for
one problem. In positive law, officers are agents of the corporation,
not of the stockholders. Because contractarians disregard the
corporation as such,252 they could not advocate officer duties running
directly to stockholders without transgressing positive law, and
they would not advocate officer duties running to the corporation
because it would transgress their own model. These theorists, like
more conventional corporate theorists, therefore failed to develop
fiduciary duties of officers--or differentiate officer duties from
director duties-as one component of good corporate governance.
Directors, in an entity conception of the firm, represent the
interests of the corporation (the principal), whereas directors in a
disaggregated nexus of contracts theory of the firm represent
investors; in neither theory does anyone expect directors to "man-
age" corporate affairs. Management of corporate affairs instead
largely falls to officers. Conceived in agency law terms, the inherent
conflict of this arrangement emerges; the board sets officers in
charge of responsibility for the principal's affairs, yet the officer
so charged is also an agent. In short, the same people are charged
to act both as agents of the principal in third party dealings and
as agents of the principal in assessing the performance of the
principal's own agents. They are not only the watched, but also the
251. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 244, at 700-03 (explaining the problem of
divergent interests between corporate principals and agents, and how fiduciary rules and
principles work to minimize this problem); Fischel, supra note 244, at 1263-64 (arguing that
market forces and legal rules can and should operate to reduce costs associated with the
agency relationship between managers and shareholders).
252. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
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watchers. This untenable conflict is made evident by understanding
officers as agents. Officers manage the corporate principal's
business but they do not and cannot monitor themselves on behalf
of the principal. Unless market constraints or social norms are
sufficient, other bodies-the board itself, various committees of the
board,253 or independent auditors-must retain, and possibly divvy
up, the function of overseeing officer performance. Revitalizing
strong fiduciary duty rules for officers would not replace but would
supplement these mechanisms with the aim of inducing greater
attentiveness to corporate rather than officer welfare.
When the board itself does not delegate but directly manages a
corporate function as, for example, in responding to a hostile
takeover effort or approving a self-dealing transaction-each of
which also implicates director self-interest-the board is effectively
acting as an agent for the corporation and it cannot, in those
instances, also monitor its own performance. In those cases of
inherent conflict, corporate law principles provide for either greater
stockholder voice or more searching judicial scrutiny as a
safeguard. 254 This same principle should apply to officers, and
mechanisms and devices for alleviating their inherent conflicts must
be developed or, in the fiduciary duty area, remembered.
At the functional level, viewing officers as agents, and the board
and various board committees as the chief legal mechanism of the
principal for monitoring officers, helps to differentiate these groups
in the state corporate governance scheme. Such a conception also
253. Congressional initiatives directed at bolstering audit committees, as well as SEC,
NYSE, and Nasdaq reforms aimed more broadly at reforming board committees, can be
understood as mechanisms for upgrading the board monitoring function. NYSE and Nasdaq
rules mandating not only independent audit committees, but also independent compensation
committees and nominating/corporate governance committees, are quite detailed in their
specifications. As just one example, under NYSE Rule 303(A)(4), the nominating/corporate
governance committee "is also responsible for taking a leadership role in shaping the
corporate governance of a corporation." NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL § 303(A)(4) commentary (2004), available at http://www.nyse.com/listed/
102222139325 1.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2005). See generally Johnson & Sides, supra note
6.
254. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,42 (Del. 1994)
(stating that heightened judicial review of director conduct is required in certain cases and
exercising such review in a change of control setting); Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445,466 (Del.
1991) (noting that the fairness of a self-dealing transaction not approved by independent
directors or ratified by stockholders may be challenged by the shareholders in a judicial
forum).
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places recent federal reforms in a new light. Although appearing to
"federalize" corporate governance in unprecedented ways, recent
reforms largely amount to a more detailed specification of director
and officer functions that nonetheless builds on the state law-
established provinces of responsibility. 5 These reform efforts flesh
out responsibilities of officers and directors but do not radically alter
their traditional spheres of influence.
That those spheres became blurred is evidenced by longstanding
references to the board and officers collectively as "management,"256
and by the failure of corporate law to differentiate the fiduciary
status of officers and directors. Understanding corporate officers as
agents can clarify these matters. No particular reform agenda flows
out of an understanding of officers as agents. The point, rather, is
that a core corporate governance interaction turns out to be an
agency relationship, even though neither positive law nor corporate
theory currently and robustly describes it in those terms. Those who
believe the weighty fiduciary duties associated with that status are
not beneficial for healthy corporate governance must make that
case.
3. Board Composition and Selection
If a proper understanding of the board's function emphasizes its
responsibility to monitor the performance of senior officers on behalf
of the corporation, common features of corporate governance that
are already the subject of concern take on an even more troubling
aspect. A number of companies have separated the CEO function
from the board chairmanship." 7 The notion is that the CEO should
not exercise undue influence over the deliberations of the non-
officer, independent directors. If, however, the board's role is to
monitor the performance of the corporation's senior officers, one
might well wonder why the CEO and, typically, other senior officers,
have a place at the directors' table at all.
255. See generally Johnson & Sides, supra note 6.
256. See supra notes 118-20, 142 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., Disney: New CEO Hired by June, CNN MONEY (Sept. 21, 2004), at
httpJ/money.cnn.com/2004109/21/news/fortune500/disney-ceo.reut/index.htm (discussing
Disney's succession plans for the two separate positions).
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No one would accept the notion that agents requiring monitoring
should monitor themselves. The matter is not so stark in the case of
a board in which a majority consists of independent directors. Even
so, however, officer presence on the board does dilute the separation
between the monitors and those to be monitored. There is certainly
the ever-present danger that even a minority officer presence on the
board could compromise the board's exercise of its monitoring
responsibility. Accordingly, one might consider whether officers
should participate in board meetings only by invitation, and in order
to fulfill reporting responsibilities, seek counsel, or request approv-
als mandated by corporate statutes. Actual membership on the
board might be foreclosed. At the very least, independent directors
should be required or at least encouraged to meet separately from
those directors who are also officers.258
Appreciation of the appropriate relation of the board to senior
officers should also have implications for the selection process for
board members. In many corporations today, the CEO effectively
chooses "his" or "her" board through influence-even if infor-
mal--over the choice of director nominees.259 The shareholders then
endorse those selections through the annual proxy solicitation
process. Recalling the agency status of the CEO and other senior
officers reveals the basic flaw in this arrangement. If the board's
duty is to monitor the senior officers on behalf of the corporate
principal, certainly it makes no sense for the agents to select, or to
exert much influence over, the people charged with ensuring their
accountability. Accordingly, nominations should be entrusted to a
committee comprised entirely of independent directors. Input from
the CEO may be acceptable, but the final decisions need to be made
by the monitors, not by the persons being monitored.
258. This is now the practice with a number of boards. See, e.g., Ellen Bryon, Managers:
Keep Out, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2004, at R4 (discussing the practice at eFunds Corporation).
It is required by NYSE rules that "non-management directors of each company must meet
at regularly scheduled executive sessions without management." NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A(3) (2004), available at http'/www.nyse.com/
listed/1022221393251.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2005).
259. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Corporate officers occupy center stage in the Enron, WorldCom,
Tyco, and other high profile corporate scandals that have drawn the
attention of lawmakers and regulators. Much attention has been
lavished on reinvigoration of the board of directors and its commit-
tees as a means to prevent similar wrongdoing. Meanwhile, the
Delaware courts continue to elaborate regularly on the fiduciary
duties owed by directors. Surprisingly, though, given their position
of primacy in corporate management and the now well-known
potential for abuse of that power, executive officers have not been
the principal target of corporate law reformers. Furthermore, the
question of their fiduciary status under state law has never received
careful, thorough consideration by the Delaware judiciary. Instead,
state fiduciary duty law-in Delaware and elsewhere-makes no
distinction between the obligations owed by directors and those of
officers. These two groups perform significantly different functions
and bear quite distinct governance responsibilities in the modern
public corporation, but they typically are simply lumped together
and described generically as "fiduciaries." As such, there has been
no effort to develop thoughtful analysis of the potentially different
legal obligations owed by directors and officers to the corporation
and its shareholders.
This failure to distinguish officers' fiduciary status from that of
directors is puzzling, both because of the obvious importance of
senior officers in corporate management, and also because there is
a well developed body of legal doctrine that supplies the missing
analytical framework. Agency law reminds us that officers are
agents of the corporate principal and, as such, are subject to a well-
developed set of fiduciary obligations that are inherent in the
agency relationship. These include duties of loyalty and care, with
the latter breached by simple negligence, in contrast to the gross
negligence standard governing directors. These core responsibilities
are supplemented by duties of good conduct, disclosure, and
obedience. Violation of these duties can subject the agent to
monetary liability to the principal for resulting injuries.
Agency concepts also illuminate the appropriate conceptual
relationship between directors and officers, and the differing
rationales for imposition of fiduciary duties. The corporate principal
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is entitled to the benefit of its agents' fiduciary responsibilities but,
lacking human capacity, must act through the board of directors if
it is to monitor, evaluate, and sanction officer behavior. Given this
crucial difference in function, it makes no sense to think about
director and officer fiduciary duty as part of a single, unitary body
of legal doctrine.
It is not enough simply to note that officers are agents of the
corporate principal and therefore subject to weighty fiduciary
obligations that are inherent in the agency relationship and
distinct from the doctrinal and policy considerations governing the
duties of corporate directors. Once the agency status of corporate
officers is appreciated, the more difficult task is to develop a more
complete understanding of the content of their fiduciary obligations,
the appropriate sanctions for breach, and the optimal standard
for judicial scrutiny of alleged officer misconduct. These issues
present a range of difficult policy questions. The answers will not
be found in existing thinking about directors' fiduciary duties.
Non-management directors perform fundamentally different
functions than officers-including monitoring of the officers'
performance-and therefore are presumptively subject to different
duties.
Senior officers have been at the center of most of the recent
corporate scandals. Agency law indicates that officers are subject to
fiduciary duties more demanding than those governing directors.
Exposure to personal liability for breach is more likely than it is for
directors, because statutory exemptions do not apply and the
application of the business judgment rule is at best uncertain. These
special fiduciary duties-grounded in agency law-provide a far
more potent mechanism for holding them accountable than does the
usual notion of an undifferentiated fiduciary duty governing officers
and directors alike. It is time to rediscover the true basis for officers'
fiduciary status and to begin the process of elaborating its practical
implications.
